A COMMENTARY
TO
K A N T’S  ‘C R I T I Q U E  O F
P U R E  R E A S O N’

BY
NORMAN KEMP SMITH, D.Phil.
McCOSH PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
AUTHOR OF
‘STUDIES IN THE CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHY’



MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN’S STREET, LONDON
1918

 

 

COPYRIGHT

 

TO THE MEMORY

OF

ROBERT ADAMSON

WISE IN COUNSEL, IN FRIENDSHIP UNFAILING

GRATEFULLY DEDICATED

 

PREFACE

The Critique of Pure Reason is more obscure and difficult than even a metaphysical treatise has any right to be. The difficulties are not merely due to defects of exposition; they multiply rather than diminish upon detailed study; and, as I shall endeavour to show in this Commentary, are traceable to two main causes, the composite nature of the text, written at various dates throughout the period 1772-1780, and the conflicting tendencies of Kant’s own thinking.

The Commentary is both expository and critical; and in exposition no less than in criticism I have sought to subordinate the treatment of textual questions and of minor issues to the systematic discussion of the central problems. Full use is made of the various selections from Kant’s private papers that have appeared, at intervals, since the publication of his Lectures on Metaphysics in 1821. Their significance has not hitherto been generally recognised in English books upon Kant. They seem to me to be of capital importance for the right understanding of the Critique.

Some apology is perhaps required for publishing a work of this character at the present moment. It was completed, and arrangements made for its publication, shortly before the outbreak of war. The printers have, I understand, found in it a useful stop-gap to occupy them in the intervals of more pressing work; and now that the type must be released, I trust that in spite of, or even because of, the overwhelming preoccupations of the war, there may be some few readers to whom the volume may be not unwelcome. That even amidst the distractions of actual campaigning metaphysical speculation can serve as a refuge and a solace is shown by the memorable example of General Smuts. He has himself told us that on his raid into Cape Colony in the South African War he carried with him for evening reading the Critique of Pure Reason. Is it surprising that our British generals, pitted against so unconventional an opponent, should have been worsted in the battle of wits?

The Critique of Pure Reason is a philosophical classic that marks a turning-point in the history of philosophy, and no interpretation, even though now attempted after the lapse of a hundred years, can hope to be adequate or final. Some things are clearer to us than they were to Kant’s contemporaries; in other essential ways our point of view has receded from his, and the historical record, that should determine our judgments, is far from complete. But there is a further difficulty of an even more serious character. The Critique deals with issues that are still controversial, and their interpretation is possible only from a definite standpoint. The limitations of this standpoint and of the philosophical milieu in which it has been acquired unavoidably intervene to distort or obscure our apprehension of the text. Arbitrary and merely personal judgments I have, however, endeavoured to avoid. My sole aim has been to reach, as far as may prove feasible, an unbiassed understanding of Kant’s great work.

Among German commentators I owe most to Vaihinger, Adickes, B. Erdmann, Cohen, and Riehl, especially to the first named. The chief English writers upon Kant are Green, Caird, and Adamson. In so far as Green and Caird treat the Critical philosophy as a half-way stage to the Hegelian standpoint I find myself frequently in disagreement with them; but my indebtedness to their writings is much greater than my occasional criticisms of their views may seem to imply. With Robert Adamson I enjoyed the privilege of personal discussions at a time when his earlier view of Kant’s teaching was undergoing revision in a more radical manner than is apparent even in his posthumously published University lectures. To the stimulus of his suggestions the writing of this Commentary is largely due.

My first study of the Critique was under the genial and inspiring guidance of Sir Henry Jones. With characteristic kindliness he has read through my manuscript and has disclosed to me many defects of exposition and argument. The same service has been rendered me by Professor G. Dawes Hicks, whose criticisms have been very valuable, particularly since they come from a student of Kant who on many fundamental points takes an opposite view from my own.

I have also to thank my colleague, Professor Oswald Veblen, for much helpful discussion of Kant’s doctrines of space and time, and of mathematical reasoning.

Mr. H. H. Joachim has read the entire proofs, and I have made frequent modifications to meet his very searching criticisms. I have also gratefully adopted his revisions of my translations from the Critique. Similar acknowledgments are due to my colleague, Professor A. A. Bowman, and to my friend Dr. C. W. Hendel.

I have in preparation a translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, and am responsible for the translations of all passages given in the present work. In quoting from Kant’s other writings, I have made use of the renderings of Abbott, Bernard, and Mahaffy; but have occasionally allowed myself the liberty of introducing alterations.

Should readers who are already well acquainted with the Critique desire to use my Commentary for its systematic discussions of Kant’s teaching, rather than as an accompaniment to their study of the text, I may refer them to those sections which receive italicised headings in the table of contents.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

London, January 1918.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION PAGE I. Textual—       Kant’s Method of composing the Critique of Pure Reason xix II. Historical—       Kant’s Relation to Hume and to Leibniz xxv III. General—       1. The Nature of the a priori xxxiii

valign="top">      2. Kant’s Contribution to the Science of Logic xxxvi       3. The Nature of Consciousness xxxix       4. Phenomenalism, Kant’s Substitute for Subjectivism xlv       5. The Distinction between Human and Animal Intelligence xlvii       6. The Nature and Conditions of Self-Consciousness l       7. Kant’s threefold Distinction between Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason lii       8. The place of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophical System lv THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON[1] Title 1 Motto 4 Dedication to Freiherr von Zedlitz 6 Preface To the First Edition 8     Comment on Preface 10     Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism 13 Preface To the Second Edition 17     The Copernican Hypothesis 22 Introduction 26     Comment upon the Argument of Kant’s Introduction 33     How are Synthetic a priori Judgments possible? 43     The Analytic and Synthetic Methods 44     Purpose and Scope of the Critique 56     Kant’s relation to Hume 61     Meaning of the term Transcendental 73 The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic 79-166     Definition of Terms 79     Kant’s conflicting Views of Space 88   Section I. Space 99     Kant’s Attitude to the Problems of Modern Geometry 117   Section II. Time

tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">123     Kant’s Views regarding the Nature of Arithmetical Science 128     Kant’s conflicting Views of Time 134     General Observations on the Transcendental Aesthetic 143     The Distinction between Appearance and Illusion 148     Kant’s Relation to Berkeley 155     The Paradox of Incongruous Counterparts 161 Part II. The Transcendental Logic 167   Introduction 167     I. Logic in General 167     II. Transcendental Logic 170     III. The Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic 172 Division I. The Transcendental Analytic 174   Book I. The Analytic of Concepts 175     Chapter I. The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding 175       Section I. The Logical Use of the Understanding 176         Comment on Kant’s Argument 176         Stages in the Development of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction 186       Section II. The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgment 192       Section III. The Categories on Pure Concepts of the Understanding 194         Distinction between Logical Forms and Categories 195   Chapter II. Deduction of the Pure Concepts Of The Understanding 202     Analysis of the Text: the Four Stages in the Development of Kant’s Views 202-234     I. Enumeration of the Four Stages 203     II. Detailed Analysis of the Four Stages 204       Kant’s Doctrine of the Transcendental Object 204     III. Evidence yielded by the “Reflexionen” and “Lose Blätter” in Support of the Analysis of the Text 231     IV. Connected Statement and Discussion of Kant’s Subjective and Objective Deductions in the First Edition 234       Distinction between the Subjective and the Objective Deductions

align="right" valign="bottom">235       The Subjective Deduction in its initial empirical Stages 245       Objective Deduction as given in the First Edition 248       The later Stages of the Subjective Deduction 263       The Distinction between Phenomenalism and Subjectivism 270       Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Second Edition 284       The Doctrine of Inner Sense 291       Kant’s Refutations of Idealism 298       Inner Sense and Apperception 321   Book II. The Analytic of Principles 332     Chapter I. The Schematism of Pure Concepts Of the Understanding 334     Chapter II. System of All Principles of Pure Understanding 342     1. The Axioms of Intuition 347     2. The Anticipations of Perception 349     3. The Analogies of Experience 355       A. First Analogy 358       B. Second Analogy 363         Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument 365         Kant’s Subjectivist and Phenomenalist Views of the Causal Relation 373         Reply to Further Criticisms of Kant’s Argument 377         C. Third Analogy 381           Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument 387     4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General 391   Chapter III. On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects whatever into Phenomena and Noumena 404     Relevant Passages in the Section on Amphiboly 410     Alterations in the Second Edition 412     Comment on Kant’s Argument 414   Appendix. The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection 418   Division II. The Transcendental Dialectic

href="@public@vhost@g@gutenberg@html@files@43572@[email protected]#page_424" class="pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">424           Introductory Comment upon the composite Origin and conflicting Tendencies of the Dialectic 425           The History and Development of Kant’s Views in regard to the Problems of the Dialectic 431   Introduction 441     I. Transcendental Illusion 441     II. Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion 442 Book I. The Concepts of Pure Reason 446     Section I. Ideas in General 447     Section II. The Transcendental Ideas 450     Section III. System of the Transcendental Ideas 453 Book II. The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason 455   Chapter I. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason 455           First Paralogism: of Substantiality 457           Second Paralogism: of Simplicity 458           Third Paralogism: of Personality 461           Fourth Paralogism: of Ideality 462       Second Edition Statement of the Paralogisms 466       Is the Notion of the Self a necessary Idea of Reason? 473   Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason 478     Section I. System of the Cosmological Ideas 478     Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason 480       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 481           First Antinomy 483           Second Antinomy 488           Third Antinomy 492           Fourth Antinomy 495     Section III. The Interest of Reason in this Self-Conflict 498     Section IV. Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason in so far as they absolutely must be capable of Solution 499     Section V. Sceptical Representation of the Cosmological Questions 501

valign="top">    Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of the Cosmological Dialectic 503     Section VII. Critical Decision of the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with itself 504     Section VIII. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in regard to the Cosmological Ideas 506     Section IX. The Empirical Employment of the Regulative Principles of Reason in regard to all Cosmological Ideas 508       Solution of the First and Second Antinomies 508       Remarks on the Distinction between the Mathematical-Transcendental and the Dynamical-Transcendental Ideas 510       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 510       Solution of the Third Antinomy 512       Possibility of harmonising Causality through Freedom with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity 513       Explanation of the Relation of Freedom to Necessity of Nature 514       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 517       Solution of the Fourth Antinomy 518       Concluding Note on the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason 519       Concluding Comment on Kant’s Doctrine of the Antinomies 519   Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason 522     Section I. and II. The Transcendental Ideal 522       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 524     Section III. The Speculative Arguments in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being 525     Section IV. The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof 527       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 528     Section V. The Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God 531       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 533       Discovery and Explanation of the Transcendental Illusion in all Transcendental Proof of the Existence of a necessary Being 534       Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument 535     Section VI. The Impossibility of the Physico-Theological Proof 538     Section VII. Criticism of all Theology based on speculative Principles of Reason 541       Concluding Comment 541

class="smcap">Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic 543   The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason 543   Hypotheses not permissible in Philosophy 543   On the Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason 552   Concluding Comment on the Dialectic 558 Appendix A.   The Transcendental Doctrine of Methods 563   Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason 563     Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment 563     Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Polemical Employment 567     Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regard to Hypotheses 568     Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regard to its Proofs 568   Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason 569     Section I. The Ultimate End of the Pure Use of our Reason 569     Section II. The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason 570     Section III. Opining, Knowing, and Believing 576   Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason 579   Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason 582 Appendix B.     A more detailed Statement of Kant’s Relations to his Philosophical Predecessors 583 Index: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P,

class="pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, Z 607

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NOTE

In all references to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft I have given the original pagings of both the first and second editions. References to Kant’s other works are, whenever possible, to the volumes thus far issued in the new Berlin edition. As the Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft had not been published in this edition at the time when the Commentary was completed, the numbering given is that of B. Erdmann’s edition of 1884.

ABBREVIATIONS

Berlin edition of Kant’s works W Pagings in the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft      A Pagings in the second edition B Adickes’ edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1889) K

INTRODUCTION

I. TEXTUAL

KANT’S METHOD OF COMPOSING THE ‘CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON’

SELDOM, in the history of literature, has a work been more conscientiously and deliberately thought out, or more hastily thrown together, than the Critique of Pure Reason. The following is the account which Kant in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn (August 16, 1783) has given of its composition: