LEIBNIZ’S
NEW ESSAYS CONCERNING THE
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.

By JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D.,

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN, AND PROFESSOR (ELECT) OF MENTAL AND
MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF MINNESOTA

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CHICAGO:
SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY
1902

Copyright, 1888,
By S. C. Griggs and Company.

PREFACE.

The purpose of the series of which the present volume is one, is not, as will be seen by reference to the statement in the initial volume, to sum up in toto the system of any philosopher, but to give a “critical exposition” of some one masterpiece. In treating the “Nouveaux Essais” of Leibniz, I have found myself obliged, at times, to violate the letter of this expressed intention, in order to fulfil its spirit. The “Nouveaux Essais,” in spite of its being one of the two most extended philosophical writings of Leibniz, is a compendium of comments, rather than a connected argument or exposition. It has all the suggestiveness and richness of a note-book, but with much also of its fragmentariness. I have therefore been obliged to supplement my account of it by constant references to the other writings of Leibniz, and occasionally to take considerable liberty with the order of the treatment of topics. Upon the whole, this book will be found, I hope, to be a faithful reflex not only of Leibniz’s thought, but also of his discussions in the “Nouveaux Essais.”

In the main, the course of philosophic thought since the time of Leibniz has been such as to render almost self-evident his limitations, and to suggest needed corrections and amplifications. Indeed, it is much easier for those whose thoughts follow the turn that Kant has given modern thinking to appreciate the defects of Leibniz than to realize his greatness. I have endeavored, therefore, in the body of the work, to identify my thought with that of Leibniz as much as possible, to assume his standpoint and method, and, for the most part, to confine express criticism upon his limitations to the final chapter. In particular, I have attempted to bring out the relations of philosophy to the growing science of his times, to state the doctrine of pre-established harmony as he himself meant it, and to give something like consistency and coherency to his doctrine of material existence and of nature. This last task seemed especially to require doing. I have also endeavored to keep in mind, throughout, Leibniz’s relations to Locke, and to show the “Nouveaux Essais” as typical of the distinction between characteristic British and German thought.

JOHN DEWEY.

May, 1888.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I. The Man.   PAGE His Parents 1 His Early Education 2 His University Training at Leipsic 4 At Jena 8 At the University of Altdorf 10 His Removal to Frankfurt 10 His Mission to Paris 11 Discovery of the Calculus 12 Librarian at Hanover 13 His Activities 14 His Philosophic Writings 15 His Ecclesiastic and Academic Projects 17 His Later Years and Death 18 CHAPTER II. Sources of his Philosophy. Character of the Epoch into which Leibniz was born 20 The Thought of the Unity of the World 23 The two Agencies which formed Leibniz’s Philosophy 24 The Cartesian Influences 26 Rationalistic Method 28 Mechanical Explanation of Nature

href="@public@vhost@g@gutenberg@html@files@40957@[email protected]#Page_30" class="pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">30 Application of Mathematics 32 Idea of Evolution 33 Interpretation of these Ideas 35 Idea of Activity or Entelechy 39 Idea of Rationality 40 Idea of Organism 42 CHAPTER III. The Problem and its Solution. Unity of Leibniz’s Thought 43 Relation of Universal and Individual 44 Descartes’ Treatment of this Question 46 Spinoza’s Treatment of it 48 Leibniz’s Solution 50 All Unity is Spiritual 53 And Active 54 Is a Representative Individual 56 Contrast of Monad and Atom 58 Pre-established Harmony reconciles Universal and Individual 59 Meaning of this Doctrine 62 CHAPTER IV. Locke and Leibniz.—Innate Ideas. Necessity of Preliminary Account of Leibniz’s Philosophy 66 Locke’s Empiricism 67 Leibniz’s Comments upon Locke 69 The Controversies of Leibniz 72 The Essay on the Human Understanding 73 Locke’s Denial of Innate Ideas 75 Depending upon (1) His Mechanical Conception of Innate Ideas 77 Leibniz undermines this by substituting an Organic Conception 80 And upon (2) His Mechanical Conception of Consciousness 84 Leibniz refutes this by his Theory of Unconscious Intelligence 85 CHAPTER V. Sensation and Experience. Importance of Doctrine regarding Sensation 87 The Two Elements of Locke’s Notion of Sensation 89 Its Relation to the Object producing it: Primary and Secondary Qualities

tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">91 Locke criticized as to his Account (1) Of the Production of Sensation 92 (2) Of its Function in Knowledge 95 The Meaning of Physical Causation 97 Bearing of this Doctrine upon Relation of Soul and Body 98 Criticism of Locke’s Dualism 98 Leibniz’s Monism 101 Summary of Discussion 103 Leibniz on the Relation of Sensations to Objects occasioning them 105 Nature of Experience 106 Distinction of Empirical from Rational Knowledge 107 CHAPTER VI. The Impulses and the Will. The Doctrine of Will depends upon that of Intelligence 109 The Character of Impulse 111 Of Desire 112 Half-Pains and Pleasures 113 The Outcome of Desire 115 Nature of Moral Action 117 Of Freedom 118 (1) Freedom as Contingency 119 Limitation of this Principle 121 (2) Freedom as Spontaneity 123 This Principle is too Broad to be a Moral Principle 125 (3) True Freedom is Rational Action 125 Our Lack of Freedom is due to our Sensuous Nature 128 Innate Practical Principles 129 Moral Science is Demonstrative 130 CHAPTER VII. Matter and its Relation to Spirit. Locke’s Account of Matter and Allied Ideas the Foundation of the Philosophy of Nature Characteristic of British Empiricism 132 Space and Matter wholly Distinct Ideas 134 Leibniz gives Matter a Metaphysical Basis 137 Ordinary Misunderstanding of Leibniz’s Ideas of Matter 138 Matter is not composed of Monads 139 Matter is the Passive or Conditioned Side of Monads 140

Passivity equals “Confused Representations,” i. e. Incomplete Development of Reason 144 Matter is logically Necessary from Leibniz’s Principles 145 Bearing of Discussion upon Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony 146 Summary 147 CHAPTER VIII. Material Phenomena and their Reality. What is the Connection between Matter as Metaphysical and as Physical? 151 The Latter is the “Image” of the Former 151 Leibniz’s Reaction from Cartesian Theory 152 His Objections are (1) Physical and (2) Logical 153 (1) Motion is Source of Physical Qualities of Bodies 155 Hence there are no Atoms 158 Secondary Qualities as well as Primary depend upon Motion 160 (2) What is the Subject to which the Quality of Extension belongs? 161 It is the Monad as Passive 162 Space and Time connect the Spiritual and the Sensible 164 Distinction between Space and Time, and Extension and Duration 166 Space and Time are Relations 167 Leibniz’s Controversy with Clarke 168 Leibniz denies that Space and Time are Absolute 170 What is the Reality of Sensible Phenomena? 173 It consists (1) In their Regularity 174 (2) In their Dependence upon Intelligence and Will 175 Leibniz and Berkeley 177 CHAPTER IX. Some Fundamental Conceptions. Locke’s Account of Substance as Static 179 The Distinction between Reality and Phenomena 180 Leibniz’s Conception of Substance as Dynamic 181 His Specific Criticisms upon Locke 182 The Categories of Identity and Difference Locke also explains in a Mechanical Way 183 Leibniz regards them as Internal and as Organic to each other 184 Locke gives a Quantitative Notion of Infinity 188 And hence makes our Idea of it purely Negative 189 Leibniz

denies that the True Notion of Infinity is Quantitative 189 He also denies Locke’s Account of the Origin of the Indefinite 192 In General, Locke has a Mechanical Idea, Leibniz a Spiritual, of these Categories 193 CHAPTER X. The Nature and Extent of Knowledge. Locke’s Definition and Classification of Knowledge 196 Leibniz’s Criticism 197 Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant regarding Knowledge of Objects 198 The Degrees of Knowledge,—Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive 199 Locke’s Contradictory Theories regarding the Origin of Knowledge 202 Locke starts both with the Individual as given to Consciousness and with the Unrelated Sensation 204 Either Theory makes Relations or “Universals” Unreal 205 As to the Extent of Knowledge, that of Identity is Wide, but Trifling 205 That of Real Being includes God, Soul, and Matter, but only as to their Existence 206 And even this at the Expense of contradicting his Definition of Knowledge 206 Knowledge of Co-existence is either Trifling or Impossible 207 Leibniz rests upon Distinction of Contingent and Rational Truth 209 The Former may become the Latter, and is then Demonstrative 210 The Means of this Transformation are Mathematics and Classification 215 There are Two Principles,—One of Contradiction 217 The Other of Sufficient Reason 218 The Latter leads us to God as the Supreme Intelligence and the Final Condition of Contingent Fact 219 The Four Stages of Knowledge 222 CHAPTER XI. The Theology of Leibniz. Leibniz’s Three Arguments for the Existence of God 224 The Value of the Ontological 225 The Cosmological 226 The Teleological 226 The Attributes of God 227 The Relation of God to the World, his Creating Activity 228 Creation involves Wisdom and Goodness as well as Power 229 The Relation of God to Intelligent Spirits: they form a Moral Community 230 Leibniz as the Founder of Modern German Ethical Systems

href="@public@vhost@g@gutenberg@html@files@40957@[email protected]#Page_231" class="pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">231 The End of Morality is Happiness as Self-realization 232 The Three Stages of Natural Right 234 The Basis of Both Leibniz’s Ethics and Political Philosophy is Man’s Relation to God 236 His Æsthetics have the Same Basis 237 Man’s Spirit as Architectonic 238 CHAPTER XII. Criticism and Conclusion. Leibniz’s Fundamental Contradiction is between his Method and his Subject Matter 240 The Use which Leibniz makes of the Principle of Sufficient Reason reveals this Contradiction 242 The Contradiction is between the Ideas of Formal and of Concrete Unity 243 From this Contradiction flow (1) The Contradiction in the Notion of Individuality 246 Which becomes purely Negative 247 The Negative he interprets as merely Privative 249 (2) The Contradiction in his Conception of God has the Same Source 250 He really has Three Definitions of God 250 One results in Atomism, another in Pantheism 251 The Third in a Conception of the Organic Harmony of the Infinite and Finite 252 (3) The Contradiction between the Real and the Ideal in the Monads has the Same Source 253 (4) As have also the Contradictions in the Treatment of the Relations of Matter and Spirit 254 (5) And finally, his Original Contradiction leads to a Contradictory Treatment of Knowledge 257 Summary as to the Positive Value of Leibniz 259 The Influence of Leibniz’s Philosophy 261 Especially upon Kant 262 Kant claims to be the True Apologist for Leibniz 263 (1) As to the Doctrine of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction 263 Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Judgment 266 (2) As to the Relation of Monads and Matter 268 Which finds its Kantian Analogue in the Relation of the Sensuous and Supersensuous 268 (3) And finally, as to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony 269 Which Kant transforms into Harmony between Understanding and Sense 269 And between the Categories of the

Understanding and the Ideas of Reason 270 Conclusion 272