WHY WE ARE AT WAR: GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE

With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized English Translation of the White Book issued by the German Government

Second Edition Revised (fourth impression) containing the Russian Orange Book

1914

PREFACE

We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of the present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake. We have some experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our fifth chapter, which to many readers will be the most interesting, is founded upon first-hand evidence—the documents contained in the British White Book (Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as Correspondence respecting the European Crisis), and the German White Book, which is an official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, as being difficult of access, we have printed in extenso. It exists in two versions, a German and an English, both published for the German Government. We have reproduced the English version without correcting the solecisms of spelling and expression. From the English White Book we have reprinted, in the second appendix, a small selection of the more significant documents; many more are quoted in the body of our work.

Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams, Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestions and assistance.

The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those who sign this Preface.

Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to the Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the Belgian nation, and especially for the University of Louvain.

E. BARKER
H. W. C. DAVIS
C. R. L. FLETCHER
ARTHUR HASSALL
L. G. WICKHAM LEGG
F. MORGAN

Preface to Second Edition.

By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are now able to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained in the Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in the German and the British White Books. In the light of the evidence afforded by the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one or two sentences in this edition.

21 September, 1914.

CONTENTS

TABLE OF DATES

CHAPTER I

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

Belgian neutrality—The origin of Belgium—England and the smaller Powers—The Treaty of 1839—Belgium's independence and neutrality.—The neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg—Its origin—The Treaty of 1867—The collective guarantee.—The strategic importance of Belgium—German plans long suspected.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871

Introduction—The Triple Alliance—Bismarck's dismissal—French colonial advance—-Germany's demands for compensations—The Anglo-French agreement concerning Morocco—German objections—England and Russia—The Agadir incident—Anglo-French exchange of notes—Disputes in the Balkans—The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886—Count Caprivi's law of 1893—Franco-Russian entente—German military preparations—France's response—Russia's reorganization—England's Army and Navy.

Note. Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY

Estrangement of Russia and Germany—Austria and the Balkans—German penetration through the Balkans—Servia and Russia—Germany and the Slavs—Russia and England.

CHAPTER IV

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914

Diary of the Events leading to the War.

CHAPTER V

NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS

Dramatis personae. §1. Germany's attitude to Russia and Austria—Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia—Germany shields Austria—Conduct of Germany considered—Sir Edward Grey proposes mediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers—Germany's objections to a 'Conference'—Direct conversations between the Powers—Austria invited to suspend military action—Mobilization; on whom does responsibility lie?—War inevitable. §2. Germany's attitude to France—Germany accuses France of military preparations—Germany invades France. §3. The question of British neutrality—Possibility of England being involved—Germany warned—German 'bid for British neutrality'—England's refusal—France agrees, and Germany refuses, to respect Belgian neutrality—Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey—Neutrality of Luxemburg violated—Germany demands a free passage through Belgium—Sir Edward Grey protests—Belgium invaded—England's ultimatum—The Imperial Chancellor urges necessity of Germany's action. §4. England and Servia—Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia—He is only concerned for the peace of Europe—He urges mediation—He proposes a Conference. §5. Great Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and France—Proposals by MM. Sazonof and Poincaré—England's refusal—Was it wise?—The Austrian dossier. §6. Italy's comments on the situation—Significance of Italy's position—Italy's endeavours to prevent war—Italy's declaration of neutrality.

Note. Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply.

CHAPTER VI

THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE

The principles of raison d'etat and the rule of law—Treitschke's teaching—The results of this philosophy—Contempt for public law—The glorification of war—The philosophy pagan—Its adoption by Prussian soldiers and Government—A plea for Prussia—England fights for law.

EPILOGUE

APPENDIXES

I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK

II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK

CHIEF DATES

CHAPTER I

I

The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the idea of a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically and geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; its boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers and cut across the ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it must be added that its population is heterogeneous both in race and language. These facts, however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of Belgium as a nation. She is a sovereign state by the same charter as Italy or Greece; and for the convenience of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutral state, endowed with special privileges but burdened with corresponding obligations. While those privileges were maintained—and they have been rigidly maintained for more than eighty years—the Belgian people punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have declined to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful neighbour, or by participating in the violation of European public law, their country is a wilderness of smoking ruins.

In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, Belgium has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and respect than those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, or by the doctrines of international law. She has more than

The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of Belgium—with the exception of the bishopric of Liège, which was until 1795 an ecclesiastical principality—were known in the seventeenth century as the Spanish, in the eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. They received the first of these names when they returned to the allegiance of Philip II, after a short participation in the revolt to which Holland owes her national existence. When the independence of Holland was finally recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were subjected to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has seen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Münster (1648), and Antwerp was thus precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. In the age of Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were constantly attacked by France, who acquired at one time or another the chief towns of Artois and Hainault, including some which have lately come into prominence in the great war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, however, of the Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to Austria, then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed with the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown at the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian Netherlands and Liège in November, 1792; and immediately afterwards threw down a gauntlet to England by opening to all nations the navigation of the Scheldt. This, and the threatened French attack on Holland, her ally, drew England into conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in French hands and as an open port would be a dangerous menace; and secondly, the French had announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile to all standing treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise in France and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot recognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[1] The answer of William Pitt, which in effect declared war upon the Revolution, contains a memorable statement of the attitude towards public law which England held then, as she holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also have the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies.... England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended natural right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of all the Powers'.[2]

This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of Western Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, a commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where she had no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Lunéville (February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to adopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance of these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced upon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November, 1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that the French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleon replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interview with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points of resemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between Sir Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable, to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance of treaties.

To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars that Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves or the German people against an aggressive French Government. The allies therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric of Liège in order 'to put Holland in a position to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. This arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was no government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after the retirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggested by Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the great privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at the Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands was declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.

But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that this union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The Belgians complained that they were not allowed their just share of influence and representation in the legislature or executive. They resented the attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch Liberalism upon them. They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, and drew up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary constitution. Their aspirations aroused much sympathy both in England and in France. These two countries induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to recognize the new

We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the Treaty of 1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore desirable to point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to prevent England from supporting the cause of France. It was with this object that he published the proposal alleged to have been made to him by the French representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that Prussia should help France to acquire Belgium as a solace for Prussian annexations in Northern Germany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The result was that, on the instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France entered into an identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the effect that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great Britain would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The treaty was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept. 1870) the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport the German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused.

Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired her special status. As an independent state she is bound by the elementary principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuse to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well-established rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great Powers at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of the Convention [3] then drawn up respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land runs as follows:—

'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'.

Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. 2:—

'Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or supplies'.

By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent upon her perpetual neutrality:—

'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states'.[4]

It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, it seems, has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the German Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard to Belgium, Germany has assumed the position which the Government of the French Revolution adopted towards the question of the Scheldt, and which Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland and Holland. Now, as then, England has special interests at stake. The consequences of the oppression or the extinction of the smaller nationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm in England. In particular she cannot forget how she would be menaced by the establishment of a militarist state in Belgium. But since in England's case the dangers and uncertainties of a state of things in which Might is treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to be expected that she should insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of treaties, a sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the strongest nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no nation is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can meet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition would be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, impartial onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered both these questions with an unhesitating negative.

II

Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour; and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5] of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a casus belli. England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the case of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our power to help the states within our reach.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which had lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placed under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of its former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retained its own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke of Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some ways anomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, and possessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength some competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar among the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable link in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all land between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on behalf of the

This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolution of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortress with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian Zollverein, and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character of its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption into Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented itself for reopening the question until 1866.

In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussia and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on the other would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposing peace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage to herself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted only seven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by the absorption of several German states and by the formation of the North German Confederation under her leadership. This, the first shattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had received, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian power, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.

This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrison owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrison should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice of the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow that the French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. At the same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weak Power as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congress held in London in the following May.

Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable. Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortress no longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raised no objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in the Congress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy should be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'.[6] A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the second article ran as follows:—

'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.

'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other States.

'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral State'.[7]

The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the restoration of the fortifications.

Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as compensation for the loss of Metz.

In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne.

There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee of the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear that England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and France. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection; as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,' should Luxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon of 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a casus belli.

III

It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that her eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, the north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre, and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along the Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for military operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deep valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to rectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and in a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampart which has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort, Épinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line without violating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the north the line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss frontier apparently gives a

In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liège and thence into France past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army could debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch as the French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had not strongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as the country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckoned that the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in this manner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east.

As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral. It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controlling as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not be allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communication between one portion of the German army and another.

That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the shoulders of Great Britain.

This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology. Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered by Liège, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause. For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.

Notes:

[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.]

[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 281-9.]

[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]

[Footnote 5: Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, (Cd. 7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.]

[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. iii, p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of Prussia of Collective Guarantee by Powers of Neutrality of Luxemburg, London, 7th May, 1867.']

[Footnote 7: Hertslet, ut sup., vol. iii, p. 1803. The High Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]

[Footnote 8: Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]

[Footnote 9: Correspondence respecting the European Crisis, p. 62, no. 116. July 31, 1914. See also infra pp. 82 et seqq.]

CHAPTER II