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قراءة كتاب Legal Status of Women in Iowa
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possibly, his caprice might suggest," and it was the wife's duty to follow him. If she refused to accompany him, no matter upon what ground she based her refusal, she was guilty of desertion. A promise by the husband before marriage as to the establishment of the place of residence of the family, created a moral obligation only and was a mere nullity in law. Whenever there was a difference of opinion between husband and wife in regard to the location of the common home, the will of the wife had to yield to that of the husband. This law of domicile was based upon the grounds of the "identity of the husband and wife, the subjection of the wife to the husband, and the duty of the wife to make her home with her husband."
Neither husband nor wife was competent as a witness to testify either for or against the other in civil or criminal cases.
The husband was entitled to the society and services of his wife and he might bring an action for damages against anyone who harbored her, or persuaded or enticed her to leave him or live separate from him. If injuries were wrongfully inflicted upon her, two actions might be brought against the party responsible for the wrong, one by husband and wife for the personal injury to the wife, and one by the husband for loss of the wife's services. In either case, the amount recovered belonged to the husband.
The wife could neither sue or be sued unless her husband was joined with her in the suit. A judgment recovered against her alone was void, because she was unknown to the law apart from her husband. One entered in her favor became the property of her husband.
The consent of the husband was necessary to enable a married woman to act as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee.
The husband became responsible for the maintenance of the wife according to her rank and station, and if he failed to make suitable provision for her, tradesmen might furnish her with necessaries at her request and could collect payment from the husband. Liable for anti-nuptial contracts. He was liable for all of her debts contracted before marriage, and this was the case, though he may have received no property with her. He was responsible for certain wrongs committed by her after marriage, such as libel and slander, and judgment could be recovered against him. If a wrong were committed jointly by both, action might be brought against the husband alone. Torts of wife. When a judgment was recovered upon contract, or because of the wrongful act of the wife, if the husband failed to pay it, he might be imprisoned.
After the death of the husband the law gave the widow a right to remain forty days in his house, during which time her dower might be assigned. This right was known as the "widow's quarantine."
The father was legally entitled to the custody of his children,—the right of the mother was never recognized, it being expressly stated by Blackstone that "a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect." He might by will appoint a guardian for them after his death, though yet unborn, and might apprentice them or give them into the custody of others without the consent of the mother.
All personal property belonging to the wife vested absolutely in the husband at marriage. He could will it to whom he pleased or, if he died without a will, it descended to his heirs. Even her wearing apparel and ornaments known by the term "paraphernalia," belonged to the husband. Wife's paraphernalia During his life he had the power to sell or give them away, but he could not devise them by will. If they remained in the possession of the wife while the husband lived, she was entitled to them over and above her dower, but even then creditors of the husband might claim them, if there chanced to be a deficiency of other assets with which to pay the debts of the estate.
The wife's choses in action, or evidences of money or property due to her, such as notes, bonds, contracts or the like, belonged to the husband if he reduced them to possession during her life, and they could be taken for his debts. He might bequeath them by will, but if he died without a will they descended to his heirs. If he failed to reduce them to possession while the wife lived, after his death they would revert to her heirs. If she outlived her husband they belonged to her. After the husband's death the wife took one-third of his personal estate if there were children, and one-half if there were no children.
The husband was entitled to the control, use and enjoyment, together with the rents and profits of his wife's real estate during the marriage, and if a living child were born, he had, after the wife's death, a life estate in such property and might retain possession of it while he lived. Curtesy. This was known as the husband's title by curtsy. The wife took a dower, or life estate in one-third of the husband's lands after his death, whether there were children or not. This estate of Dower. dower was forfeited should the husband be found guilty of treason, but his interest in her lands was not disturbed by the treason of the wife. His life interest in her real estate attached to trust estates, but she could claim no interest in trust estates of her husband. If the wife owned leases of land they could be sold or assigned by the husband during marriage. If he survived his wife they belonged to him, if she survived him, they belonged to her, provided he had not disposed of them while living.
Personal property descended to males and females in equal shares, but the oldest son was entitled to the whole of his father's real property.
The unity of husband and wife was not so strongly affirmed by the common law when it dealt with their relation to criminal matters. When a wife committed an offense against the state she possessed a separate and distinct life and personalty, for the purposes of punishment. It is true that she was still inferior and this distinction was recognized and emphasized by the difference in the penalties imposed for the commission of the same crimes, these penalties being in inverse ratio to the importance of the criminal.
If a wife committed theft, burglary or other offenses in the company or presence of her husband, the law presumed that she acted under compulsion and held her not guilty, but this presumption did not extend to cases of murder or treason, and it might always be overcome by proof that she acted independently. Presumption of innocence. The exception in cases of murder or treason, we are informed, was not alone because of the magnitude of the crimes, but rather on account of "the husband having broken through the most sacred tie of social community by rebellion against the state, had no right to that obedience from a wife which he himself, as a subject, had forgotten to pay."
If a man murdered his wife it was as if he had murdered a stranger, and he might avail himself of the benefit of clergy, and secure immunity from punishment, provided he could read, but women were denied all benefit of clergy because of their sex, and because they "were not called upon to read." Murder of husband. If a wife killed her husband it was a much more serious offense,