capable of having, viz. That of Freedom or Liberty of Action: And as the constitution of such Creature, as this, implies that what is best in reference to the design of the Creator, and of its own Happiness, should not be always necessarily present to the Mind as Best; such a Creature may oppose the Will of his Maker with various degrees of Guilt in so doing; or (possibly) with none at all; for no Agent can offend farther than he wilfully abuses the Freedom he has to act.

But God having made Men so as that they find in themselves, very often, a liberty of acting according to the preference of their own Minds, it is incumbent upon them to study the Will of their Maker; in an application of the Faculty of Reason which he has given them, to the consideration of the different respects, consequences, and dependencies of Things, so as to discern from thence, the just measures of their actions in every circumstance and relation they stand plac'd in; which measures are nothing else but the dictates resulting from those views which such a consideration of things as this gives us, of what is consonant, or not so, to the design of the Creator in every particular, wherein we are concern'd to act. And these manifestations of his Will, thus discoverable to us, ought to be regarded by us, as his Commands.

Yet however certain it is, that the dictates of Reason, or Nature, discernable by our natural Faculties, are the commands of God to us, as rational Creatures; it is equally true that the love of happiness (which consists in pleasure) is the earliest, and strongest principle of Humane Nature; and therefore whatever measures Reason does, or might, prescribe, when particular occasions occur, the sentiment of what Men find pleasing or displeasing to them, however contrary to those dictates of right Reason, is very apt to determine their choice. God yet who is the Author of Order, and not of Confusion, has fram'd all things with Consistency, and Harmony; and however, in Fact, it too often happens that we are misled by that strong desire of happiness implanted in us, yet does this no way necessarily interfere with our acting in an intire conformity to the prescriptions of the Law of Reason; but the contrary: For from hence it is that this Law has its Sanction, viz. That, duly considering it, we shall evidently find our happiness, and misery, are annex'd to the observance, or neglect, of that unalterable Rule of Rectitude, discoverable to us by the Nature of Things; so that this Rule of Rectitude, or Eternal Will of God, has also the force of a Law given to it by that inseparable accord that there is betwixt our happiness or misery, with our obedience, or disobedience, hereunto. Thus our duty and happiness, can never be divided, but when we prefer a less happiness to a greater; and therein act not conformably to the dictates of our natural desire of happiness, or pleasure; which two Terms differ only in this, that we apply the Term Pleasure to any agreeable Sentiment, or Sensation, how small, or short soever in its duration; but that of Happiness, only to such degrees of pleasure, as do, in some considerable degree, out-ballance our Evils.

That we are many ways capable of receiving pleasure, we experimentally find; every sense furnishes something to delight, and please us, in its Application to Objects suited to a grateful exercise thereof. And the operations of our own Minds upon the Ideas presented to them by our Senses, afford us also other pleasures, oftentimes preferable by us to those that we receive immediately from Sense. But be our pleasures excited how they will; or whatsoever they consist in, Those that Men receive from the Gratification of antecedent desire, are the pleasures that they have the strongest relish of. A Good not desir'd, making (comparatively) but a small Impression upon us.

Now the Gratification of their desires is not always in Men's Power, but oftentimes it is so. It is then often in their choice to procure to themselves pleasure, or not. Whence it is reasonable for them to inquire, since happiness consists in pleasure; and the Gratification of their Desires, and Appetites, always gives them pleasure; whether, or no, to Gratifie These should not therefore always be that which should determine their actions in pursuance of this their chief End?

That happiness consisting in pleasure, we are so much the happier as we enjoy more pleasure, must unquestionably, be found true; but that the Gratification of Men's Desires and Appetites cannot therefore be that which should always, as they are rational Agents, determine, or regulate their actions in pursuit of happiness, is no less evident; in that we perceive our selves, and the Things to which we have relation, to be so fram'd, and constituted, in respect one of another, that the Gratification of our present Desires and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small pleasure, procure to us a greater, and more durable Pain: and that on the contrary, the denial, or restraint of our present Desires, and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small Pain, procure to us a greater, or more durable Pleasure. Since then that we should act contrary to our own end therein, and prefer less pleasure to greater, it is apparent that the Gratification of our present Appetites cannot be that which always, as we are rational Agents, proposing to our selves happiness for our chief end, should determine, or regulate our voluntary actions; present Appetite telling us only what will give us present pleasure; not what will, in the whole, procure to us the most pleasure. What else then appears to be the Rule, or Measure of Men's actions acting purely with respect to the pursuit of happiness as their chief End, but the determinations of that Faculty in them which, in reference to the different properties and relations discernable in Things, can alone be the Judge what will, in the whole, procure to them the most pleasure? And thus the very desire of happiness, or love of pleasure, rightly pursu'd, does oblige us to make the determinations or dictates of Reason, and not the suggestions of present Appetite, the Measure, and Rule of our actions in our pursuit after happiness. Which that we might possess was no doubt the end of our Creator in giving us Being; since he could not stand in need of, or be better'd by our Existence. And if that we might be happy was the end for which God made us, it is most certain that he has neither set any such measures to our Actions, or put any such unhappy Biass upon our Minds, as shall necessarily contradict this his end. Whence it again appears that the love of Pleasure implanted in us (if we faithfully pursue it in prefering always that which will, on the whole, procure to us the most pleasure) can never mislead us from the observance of the Law of Reason: And that this Law enjoyns only a right regulation of our natural desire of pleasure, to the end of our obtaining the greatest happiness that we are capable of: so that there is an inseparable connection, or relation of Moral Good and Evil, with our Natural Good, and Evil. To assert therefore that our chief Good does consist in pleasure, is far from drawing after it any such consequence as many have pretended it does, in prejudice to the Law of Reason, that Natural Revelation of Gods Will to us; since no Man can upon due consideration thereof Judge, That the Gratification of his present Appetites ought to be to him the Measure or Rule of his Actions in consequence of Pleasures being his chief Good: experience it self, we see, contradicting such a consequence: and that so evidently that I think we do not in fact find that even Those, who the most indulge to their Passions and Appetites, do so as believing upon a cool examination thereof, that to do thus is the truest Wisdom, in consequence of our greatest Good consisting in pleasure; but such Men indulge to their present Appetites meerly as being strongly induc'd (contrary oftentimes to the suggestions