from an elevation three-quarters of a mile South and East of Allatoona, and for two hours maintained a furious cannonade, that, concentrated upon the two redoubts, filled the air with smoke and fragments of shell, and deafened the ear with almost incessant detonations. Meanwhile French’s skirmish lines were vigorously pushed round to the West and North until, with the exception of the steep and timbered valley of Allatoona Creek on the extreme East, the garrison was completely invested.

At 8:30, amid a temporary lull of the uproar that had prevailed, a flag of truce was sent in bearing the following message: It was dated

In making his report subsequently, French endorses on a copy of this summons, the following:

Whatever may have been the external conditions that led to this view of the matter on the part of General French, there is no question that Corse did reply, and promptly and to the point. He wrote his answer on the top of a neighboring stump, and a splinter or two may have gotten in it:

When this reply had been dispatched, Corse remarked, “They will now be upon us,” and nothing remained but to notify the several commands of the purport of the correspondence, and to prepare for the bloody work that lay before them.

French commanded a division in the corps of Lieutenant-General Stewart, which had been dispatched by Hood Eastward from Dallas to destroy the railroad, as witnessed by Sherman from the summit of Kenesaw, and his report, dated Nov. 5, from which the following particulars of his movements are derived, is of great interest.

Stewart had struck the railroad at Big Shanty, four miles North of Kenesaw on the evening of October 3rd, and his three divisions labored all night at their task, completing it as far as Acworth. This work accomplished, French’s division was sent Northward under direct orders from Hood, which are given in French’s report, and have some peculiar features. Both orders are dated October 4th, and were handed to French at Big Shanty by Stewart at noon. The earlier one said that French “Shall move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona with logs, brush, dirt etc.” Also that when at Allatoona, French was, if possible, to move to the Etowah Bridge, the destruction of which would “be of great advantage to the army and the country.” The second order again urged the importance of destroying the Etowah Bridge, if such were possible, and that as the enemy (Sherman), could not disturb him before the next day, he was to “get his artillery in position and then call for volunteers with ‘lightwood’ to go to the bridge and burn it.”

The curious points about these instructions are, in the first place, the absurdity of a wearied body of troops undertaking such a task as that of filling up a railway cut 65 feet deep and some 300 or 400 yards long, in the way described, with “logs and dirt” and the futility of doing it, if it were possible. It would have taken French several days to fill up that cut, even assuming him to be uninterfered with, and one day’s labor would open it again.

The second point is the absence of any reference to a garrison at Allatoona, or to the accumulation of stores there. French was a good soldier, and after stating in his report that as both he and Stewart knew the facts in the case and were aware of the large amount of stores, they considered it important that the place be captured, contents himself with saying, dryly, “It would appear, however, from these orders, that the General-in-Chief was not aware that the Pass I was sent to have filled up was fortified and garrisoned.” The fact is that it requires something more than mere courage to command an army, and it seems likely that a few such specimens of leadership cost Hood the confidence of his subordinates, and thoroughly justified Sherman in a disparaging remark he made respecting him a day or two later.

Stewart gave French 12 pieces of artillery under Major Myrick and at 3:30 P. M. of the 4th he marched away to Acworth, but was detained there until 11 at night by lack of rations. The night was dark, the roads bad, and he didn’t know the country. From Acworth he reports seeing night signalling between Kenesaw and Allatoona, and fearing that reinforcements might be sent from the Northward, he dispatched a small cavalry force to reach the railroad as close to the Etowah as possible and take up the rails. It was a wise precaution, but undertaken too late, as Corse was at Allatoona by midnight. French arrived there about 3 in the morning, and, as he writes, “Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights and nothing was heard except the occasional interchange of shots between our advance guards and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below.” He placed his artillery in position at Moore’s, 1300 yards south and east of the Post, an admirable location for the purpose intended, having an open view of the defences across the intervening hollow, left with it the 39th North Carolina and the 32nd Texas, of Young’s brigade, as supports, and sought to gain the ridge west of the fortifications, intending to attack at daybreak, but after floundering in the Egyptian darkness of the forest, with no roads and over a rugged country, and unavailingly seeking, notwithstanding the aid of a guide, to get upon the ridge westward of the works, was compelled to wait for daylight. Finally at 7:30 the head of the column arrived about 600 yards distant from the West Redoubt, and here French got his first view of the works, which impressed him at once as much more formidable than he had anticipated. Instead of one small redoubt on each side of the railroad cut, as he had been led to believe, he declares he saw no less than three on the west side and a “Star Fort” on the east, with outworks and approaches, defended to a great distance by abattis, and nearer the forts by stockades and other obstructions. It may have been the weariness of a long night march, or perhaps the too early morning air, that conjured these formidable defences to French’s eyes, or possibly, it is the exterior aspect of these works that to a covetous and hostile apprehension enlarges their numbers and proportions.

It must be