pockets.

The stealing in the custom houses was enormous. It has been estimated at over fifty per cent of the gross receipts. Every possible penny was forced from the native planters under the guise of taxes and also by the most flagrant blackmail.

By a system of differential duties, Spain still managed to retain a monopoly of the trade to Cuba while the colonists were forced to pay the highest possible rates for all they received from the mother country.

The rates of postage were absurdly outrageous. For instance there was an extra charge for delivery. When a native Cuban received a prepaid letter at his own door, he was obliged to pay thirty-seven and a half cents additional postage.

The taxes on flour were so high that wheaten bread ceased to be an article of ordinary diet. The annual consumption of bread in Spain was four hundred pounds for each person, while in Cuba, it was only fifty-three pounds, nine ounces. In fact, all the necessaries of life were burdened with most iniquitous taxation.

Then again there was the interest on the national debt. While the Spaniards paid three dollars and twenty-three cents per capita, six dollars and thirty-nine cents, nearly double, was exacted from the Cubans.

All these were the chief causes of the revolution which began in 1868, and many of them still existed a few years ago and led to the last revolution. By the way, there is but little chance but that it will prove the last, bringing as its consequence, what has been struggled for so long—the freedom of Cuba.

The standard of revolt in the Ten Years War, as has been stated, was raised by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes. He was well known as an able lawyer and a wealthy planter. In the very beginning, he was unfortunately forced to take action before he had intended to do so, by reason of news of the projected outbreak reaching the authorities in Havana.

A letter carrier, who from his actions gave rise to suspicions, was detained at Cespedes' sugar plantation, La Demajagua, and it was found that he was the bearer of an order for the arrest of the conspirators.

With this information, immediate action became necessary. Cespedes deemed it expedient to strike at once, and with only two hundred poorly equipped men, he commenced the campaign at Yara.

This place was defended by a Spanish force too strong for the insurgents. But Cespedes was not long in attracting to himself a most respectable following.

At the end of a few weeks he found himself at the head of fifteen thousand men. The little army, however, was anything but well provided with arms and ammunition. Among them were many of Cespedes' former slaves whom the general promptly liberated.

Attacks were made on Las Tunas, Cauto Embarcardero, Jiguana, La Guisa, El Datil and Santa Rita, in almost every case victory remaining with the insurgents.

On the 15th of October it was decided to attack Bayamo, an important town of ten thousand inhabitants. On the 18th the town was captured. The governor, with a small body of men, shut himself up in the fort, but a few days after was forced to capitulate.

For the relief of Bayamo, a Spanish force under Colonel Quiros, numbering, besides cavalry and artillery, about eight hundred infantry, started out from Santiago de Cuba, but was defeated and driven back to Santiago with heavy losses.

The Spanish general, Count Valmaseda, was sent from Havana into the insurrectionary district, but was attacked and forced to return, leaving his dead on the field.

Afterwards Valmaseda, who had increased his force to four thousand men, marched on Bayamo. He received a severe check at Saladillo, but eventually succeeded in crossing the Cauto. The Cubans saw the hopelessness of defending the place against such superior numbers, and, rather than have it fall into the hands of the enemy, burned the city.

In December, General Quesada, who afterward played a most prominent part in the war, landed a cargo of arms and took command of the army at Camarguey.

Before the close of the year, Spain, realizing how desperate was to be the struggle, had under arms nearly forty thousand troops which had been sent from Europe, besides twelve thousand guerillas recruited on the island and some forty thousand volunteers organized for the defense of the cities. These latter were in many respects analogous to the National Guard of the United States. They were raised from Spanish immigrants, between whom and the native Cubans have always existed a bitter enmity and jealousy.