class="pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">49
(d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, |
50 |
3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of view, |
51 |
(a) The religious sanction (Paley), |
53 |
(b) Limits of the political sanction, |
54 |
(c) Uncertainty of the social sanction, |
55 |
(d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social, |
56 |
4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, |
57 |
(a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, |
58 |
(b) Ambiguities in his proof, |
60 |
5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, |
62 |
(a) Recognition of sympathy, |
64 |
(b) The idea of equality, |
69 |
6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection, |
73 |
7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism, |
75 |
|
CHAPTER IV. |
MORAL SENTIMENT. |
1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism, |
78 |
2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, |
84 |
3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, |
89 |
(a) As harmony of impulses, |
90 |
(b) As a separate sensitive faculty, |
92 |
(c) As an internal law, |
100 |
4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, |
105 |
|
PART II. |
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. |
CHAPTER V. |
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY. |
1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, |
107 |
An assertion of the unity of life, |
109 |
Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, |
110 |
2. The development of morality, |
116 |
(a) Historical psychology, |
116 |
Its difficulties, |
117 |
Its result, |
123 |
(b) Development of society, |
124 |
|
CHAPTER VI. |
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES. |
Bearing of the theory of evolution, |
|