determined counter-attack against the Australian Division on our right. At first it was completely successful; the enemy broke through as far as Noreuil and Lagnicourt, and for a short time was actually in possession of two brigades of the Australian artillery. At about 8 a.m., however, the Anzacs made a magnificent recovery, and hurled the enemy back to his original line, retaking their guns and capturing about 400 prisoners. Over a thousand German corpses were left on the field. While all this was going on my batteries were subjected to heavy shell fire, and suffered many casualties. In one of the batteries of the 58th Division the losses were particularly severe, three officers being killed and one wounded. I sent one of the brigades of the 11th Division to reinforce the Anzacs directly the attack commenced, and this was retained after the battle, and therefore left my command.

On the 16th Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Woodcock arrived to command the D.A.C. vice Lieut.-Colonel F. Mitchell, who had gone to England.

For some time past the weather had been very inclement, and the unvarying cold and damp, added to the strain of heavy work and constant danger night and day, was having its inevitable effect on the physical powers, though not on the fighting spirit, of the officers and men behind the guns; and, it should be added, of the officers and men of the D.A.C., whose work in these operations had been of a most strenuous and perilous nature.

The men fall asleep while working at the guns. For nine or ten weeks now they have worked without a rest, and it is a question whether human endurance can go much further. They fire day and night, and when not firing they are staggering through the mud carrying up ammunition; they have no shelter except what they can dig in the ground, and no sooner have they dug a resting place than the batteries have to move to a fresh position. And the weather is beyond words abominable. If it isn't raining it's snowing, and it's impossible to keep anything dry; nothing but cold, squalor, and hideous discomfort. And yet they stick it out with the utmost courage and cheerfulness, and fight splendidly.

It was impossible to relieve the artillery as a whole, but as it was now decided to make no serious attack for at least a fortnight, I obtained authority to keep 50 per cent. of my command at rest in the wagon lines during this period, and this measure did something to relieve the strain. The horses, too, had suffered severely; about five per cent. had been killed, and ten per cent. had died of over work and debility, twenty per cent. having been sent away for the same reason. As the Veterinary authorities, who naturally knew more of the condition of the animals than of the circumstances which had brought them into so low a state, showed a disposition to attribute the state of affairs to indifferent horsemastership, I was glad when the Army Commander, Sir H. de la P. Gough, inspected my wagon lines on the 21st April. He expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with all he saw, and was most cordial and pleasant. It was a great relief to Brigade and Battery Commanders, who had been much harassed during a time of great anxiety by the criticisms referred to above, to know that the Army Commander had now seen for himself that everything possible was being done.

For the rest of the month little occurred of special interest; preparations were being made for a further attack against the Hindenburg Line, and meanwhile the now familiar form of trench warfare was carried on from trenches about 200 yards apart. The Ecoust Valley was still a far from healthy spot, though batteries improved their cover day by day by incessant building and digging; and at times the Boche turned his attention to the wagon lines as well. On the 18th the 310th lines were badly shelled, when two men were killed and seven wounded, and several horses were lost. Lieut. G. P. Senior was wounded (gassed) on the 24th, and on the 28th four more officers were hit, Lieuts. C. T. Lutyens, S. C. Ball, R. Forrest, and J. W. Proctor. Five Military Medals were awarded during this period, and the Military Cross was gained by Lieut. J. C. F. Nowill.

"On the evening of the 26th April, 1917, near Ecoust, the camouflage covering a large ammunition dump at the battery position was set ablaze by hostile shell fire. Lieut. Nowill, single-handed, removed the burning mass from the dump and extinguished it, at very great personal danger from the burning ammunition which was exploding in large quantities. By his gallantry and prompt action he undoubtedly stopped the explosions from spreading through the whole dump."

On the 25th, Lieut.-Colonel G. R. V. Kinsman, D.S.O., left, much to the regret of us all, to take up the duty of Artillery Instructor at Shoeburyness; he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel D. J. C. Sherlock, D.S.O.

Now, and afterwards, efforts were constantly being made by which to vary the monotony of trench warfare, and to make things more lively for the Huns; as an example, I select the following instance. On the 27th April, at a given time, two howitzer batteries put "stops" on selected portions of the enemy's support line about 200 yards apart. Then on the trench thus enclosed three batteries opened a rapid fire of gas and smoke shell, the object being to smoke the occupants out of their dug-outs. After five minutes of this treatment two more batteries opened with shrapnel on the only trench which could be used by the enemy if he tried to escape to the rear—this, of course, in the hope of getting some of them as they retired. The whole thing went off like clockwork, and the fire was most accurate. As to the amount of damage done, that must remain a matter of conjecture, as it was impossible to see into the trenches. In this case, as always in such experiments, one could but hope for the best.

All arrangements having been made for an attack on Bullecourt under an artillery barrage, Divisional Headquarters moved up on the 2nd May to an advanced position north of Ervillers. The attack was launched early on the 3rd as part of a big operation in which altogether fourteen divisions took part. Our infantry advanced under a barrage at 3.45 a.m., and broke through the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. The enemy was, however, in great strength, and his position was an extraordinarily formidable one. Although our men managed to get through and beyond the village, they were then checked by numerous machine guns firing from concrete emplacements, and were finally forced back again through Bullecourt by a strong counter-attack. The Division suffered very heavy losses, and the results of the battle did not come up to our high expectations; but, none the less, substantial progress had been made, and at the end of the action we were able to hold on to and consolidate a good slice of the village of Bullecourt, together with about 2000 yards of the Hindenburg front line to the east of it. It was hard that our first battle should have been so costly in life and so apparently unfruitful in results, but our sorely tried infantry had proved their mettle, and had shown that magnificent spirit in the face of appalling odds which, in the Homeric battles which were still to come, was so often to spur them on to victory.

Lieut. C. Punchard was wounded (gas) on the 7th, and Lieuts. G. H. Kitson and C. V. Montgomery were wounded on the 12th and 13th respectively.

On the 14th May there was a readjustment of the line, the 7th Division taking over the Bullecourt front and the Hindenburg trench to the South-East, while the 62nd Division became responsible for the sector from Bullecourt for about 2400 yards to the North-West. This entailed a general shuffle of the artillery, my own brigades coming under the 7th Division, while