delivered, the 9th Black Watch and 8th Seaforths leading, with the 7th Camerons in support, and the 10th Gordons in reserve. The advance was practically due East towards the Towers of Loos, these being kept slightly on our right. Within a very short time the Black Watch and Seaforths got clear away.

The Camerons, following, were very shortly streaming through the village of Loos, having crossed the third German line of wire and trenches, which had been regarded as impregnable. Unfortunately, traces of the gallant part played by the Camerons in cutting this wire, which was almost untouched by Artillery fire, were too evident, the ground being strewn with dead and wounded. The houses in Loos were practically battered to pieces. Germans were being bombed out of the cellars, others bayoneted, dozens were surrendering, but nothing seemed to stay the advance of the 44th Brigade.

The Battalion Headquarters were established in a red brick building near the church, which was now a heap of ruins. There the Commanding Officer, with the Signallers and Scouts collected round him, remained in comparative security until suddenly a number of the heaviest type of high explosive shells rained down on them. All dashed for a cellar, in which was found a German soldier. Soon after it was decided to go down into the lower cellar, where we found a German officer still telephoning. It was evident that he had directed the Artillery fire upon our Headquarters. His telephone apparatus was for a long time afterwards in the possession of, and used by, the Battalion Signallers.

As the Commanding Officer was going through the village he came across two Companies of the 7th Royal Scots Fusiliers, who attached themselves to him, and all went on together to Hill 70. On their arrival at the foot of the Hill, information was received that 300/400 of the Brigade—most of them Camerons—had pressed forward over the Hill and were heavily engaged with the enemy's lines at St. Laurent. It must be remembered that the orders received before going into action were that the Battalion was to press on to the Cité St. Auguste, beside St. Laurent, which was given to them as their final objective.

Major Crichton of the 10th Gordons handed over the command of the Hill to Colonel Sandilands, who, at once realising the gravity of the situation, decided to establish a line on the reverse slope of Hill 70. Luckily here there was a sort of natural line of defence, consisting of a bank about 3 feet high, running roughly North and South along the Hill. This proved an invaluable feature to hold on to, as men instinctively rallied to it. Major Barron, 2nd in command, 7th Camerons, and Major Crichton (10th Gordons) volunteered to go forward and order the advance party, who had charged over the Hill, to retire. Both officers fell in the task, but their orders reached the advanced line, and the men began to fight their way back. Major Crichton was killed outright, while Major Barron, who was wounded and taken prisoner, died of his wounds in a German Field Hospital.

The Commanding Officer being satisfied that his right was protected by the London Regiment which was astride the Loos Crassier, ordered the Royal Scots Fusiliers to dig in for all they were worth. There is little doubt that if these two Companies had not acted contrary to the strict letter of their orders, in coming on with Colonel Sandilands, things might have gone badly with the 15th Division. About 8 a.m. the Battalion Flag, which consisted of one of the Divisional yellow distinguishing flags, with a patch of Cameron tartan taken from an old kilt sewn on to it, was planted on Hill 70, and remained flying till midnight, when we withdrew. Throughout the operations the flag was carried by Scout-Sergeant Lamb, and on more than one critical occasion he rallied men of all regiments by waving them back to the Hill. This flag has been presented to the Depot, and is now in the Officers' Mess at Inverness. About midnight, when the line had been fairly well dug, those in front were ordered to retire. It was on the forward slope of Hill 70 that the greatest number of casualties in the 7th Camerons occurred. The confusion which of necessity arises after an assault of this nature can be realised from the fact that on Hill 70 the Commanding Officer had under his command representatives from no less than nine different Battalions.

At 3 p.m. all were cheered by seeing large bodies of troops coming over the Hill, apparently to relieve us. They turned out to be part of the 1st Division, who had been delayed in the attack on our left, and not a relief. At 6 p.m. word was received that we were to be relieved by the 62nd Brigade, but owing to some error they did not arrive until early next morning.

At 8 p.m. the Commanding Officer discussed the situation with the Brigadier, and satisfied him that the position on Hill 70 was secure for the night, and, in view of the fact that the few Camerons who still remained could not influence the situation, received orders to hand over the command to Lieut.-Colonel M'Lean of the 10th Royal Scots, and to withdraw his own men. At midnight he ordered his little band of weary Camerons to retire. Not many who came out that night will very readily forget it. In drenching rain, pools of mud, and incessant shelling, they picked their way amongst the dead by the light of burning houses, and they plodded wearily on, powerless to take any notice of the wounded who lay waiting for stretcher-bearers. Mistaking the road, they made a detour through Maroc, finally fetching up at the old Headquarters, which, although it consisted merely of a badly shelled house, appeared like a sanctuary. Without calling a proper Roll the men were numbered off, and it was found that there were 4 officers and 75 other ranks present out of 20 officers and 827 rank and file who had started off so proudly 24 hours earlier. Throughout the night and early morning stragglers kept coming in, and there were finally collected 6 officers and about 290 other ranks.

Philosophe was reached about 3 a.m., and we were lucky to find the cookers waiting for us, and, after having some tea, both officers and men slept on the ground, too exhausted to take any notice of the mud or water. The usual rumours of going back for a long rest were prevalent, a rest which was often talked about but never matured. However, about 8 a.m. 26th September, a Staff Officer came over and said that the battle was going far from well, and that there was no alternative but to send the remnant of the Battalion back into the fight. It is impossible to realise the feelings of men under such circumstances. They fell in, and went straight back, picking their way through Quality Street, which by this time was literally running with blood and blocked with wounded. On they went amidst a hail of gas shells, pushing their way through bunches of disorganised troops—raw recruits who had never before experienced the sights of a battlefield, and arriving finally at the old German front-line, where they found the trench so full of gas that they had to dig themselves in behind the parados. They held this position well on into the Monday morning, when they were finally relieved. Twenty-four hours after this these men marched out of Mazingarbe, headed by the pipes and drums, with their buttons cleaned and their equipment polished in so smart a manner that they were mistaken for a new draft, and were greeted with shouts from those whom they passed: "Wait till you have been in the trenches, and you won't look like that."

Our casualties for the day were:—