What Germany Thinks

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I—The Causes of the War

CHAPTER II—On The Leash

CHAPTER III—The Dogs Let Loose

CHAPTER IV—Mobilization

CHAPTER V—Wars and Rumours of Wars

CHAPTER VI—The Débâcle of the Social Democrats

CHAPTER VII—"Necessity Knows No Law"

CHAPTER VIII—Atrocities

CHAPTER IX—The Neutrality of Belgium and Germany's Annexation Propaganda

CHAPTER X—Saigner À Blanc

CHAPTER XI—The Intellectuals and the War

CHAPTER XII—The Literature of Hate

CHAPTER XIII—"Man to Man and Steel to Steel"

INDEX

CHAPTER I

In many quarters of the world, especially in certain sections of the British public, people believed that the German nation was led blindly into the World War by an unscrupulous military clique. Now, however, there is ample evidence to prove that the entire nation was thoroughly well informed of the course which events were taking, and also warned as to the catastrophe to which the national course was certainly leading.

Even to-day, after more than twelve months of devastating warfare, there is no unity of opinion in Germany as to who caused the war. Some writers accuse France, others England, while many lay the guilt at Russia's door. They are only unanimous in charging one or other, or all the powers, of the Triple Entente. We shall see that every power now at war, with the exception of Germany and Italy, has been held responsible for Armageddon, but apparently it has not yet occurred to Germans that the bearer of guilt for this year's bloodshed—is Germany alone!

It is true that the conflict between Austria and Serbia forms the starting point. Whether or not Serbia was seriously in the wrong is a matter of opinion, but it is generally held that Austria dealt with her neighbour with too much heat and too little discretion. Austria kindled the flames of war, but it was Germany's mission to seize a blazing torch and set Europe alight.

When the text of Austria's ultimatum became known, a very serious mood came over Germany. There was not a man who did not realize that a great European War loomed on the horizon. A well-organized, healthy public opinion could at that period have brought the governments of the Germanic Powers to recognize their responsibility. Had the German Press been unanimous, it might have stopped the avalanche. But there were two currents of opinion, the one approving, the other condemning Austria for having thrown down the gauntlet to Serbia and above all to Russia.

One paper exulted over the statement that every sentence in Austria's ultimatum "was a whip-lash across Serbia's face;" a phrase expressing so aptly the great mass of popular opinion. This expression met with unstinted approval, for it corresponded with German ideals and standards in dealing with an opponent. Yet there was no lack of warnings, and very grave ones too. A glance at German newspapers will suffice to prove this statement.

On July 24th, 1914, Krupp's organ, the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, contained the following: "The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum is nothing but a pretext for war, but this time a dangerous one. It seems that we are standing on the verge of an Austro-Serbian war. It is possible, very possible, that we shall have to extinguish East-European conflagrations with our arms, either because of our treaties or from the compulsion of events. But it is a scandal if the Imperial Government (Berlin) has not required that such a final offer should be submitted to it for approval before its presentation to Serbia. To-day nothing remains for us but to declare: 'We are not bound by any alliance to support wars let loose by the Hapsburg policy of conquest.'"

The Post wrote on the same date: "Is that a note? No! it is an ultimatum of the sharpest kind. Within twenty-four hours Austria demands an answer. A reply? No! but an absolute submission, the utter and complete humiliation of Serbia. On former occasions we have (and with justice) made fun of Austria's lack of energy. Now we have a proof of energy which terrifies us. This 'note' represents about the very uttermost which can be said to any government, and such things are only said when the sender of the 'note' has absolutely determined upon war."

The principal organ of Germany's largest political party, the Social Democrats, contained a still more emphatic protest on July 25th. A telegram from the Belgrade correspondent of the Vorwärts runs: "Since the presentation of Austria's note, public opinion has become exceedingly serious, although the city is still very calm. The general view held is that Austria's ultimatum is unacceptable for a sovereign State. In Belgrade no one doubts that Russia will stand by Serbia. Everyone is certain that in consequence of Austria's excessively sharp tone, Russia will not remain inactive should Austria resort to armed force. The populace is prepared for war."

In view of the subsequent attitude of Germany's Social Democrats, an official proclamation, published in all their seventy-seven daily papers on July 25th, is of supreme importance. At that date they had apparently no doubt whatever as to the guilty party. The change of front in the Reichstag on August 4th would seem in the light of this proclamation, as nothing other than a betrayal of conscience. Further, the split which has arisen in their ranks during the war leads to the supposition that Liebknecht, Kautsky and Bernstein have been troubled by the inward