diplomacy. If that failed an immediate appeal to the sword should follow. The diplomatic forty-eight hours' coup-de-main failed, and the programme contained no other item except war. In a few words this means that the dastardly crime of Princip and his fellow conspirators was exploited by Germany, acting through Austria, to disturb the European balance of power under the guise of a just vengeance.

Sir Edward Grey formulated and circulated his conference proposal on the next day, July 26th. Some persons to whom I spoke at the time welcomed the idea; they belonged principally to the lower middle classes. One well-known Pan-Germanist (Dr. Beckmann, professor of history in Erlangen University) said that the proposal was an admission of a diplomatic defeat and a sign that the Entente Powers were afraid to draw the sword. If the three Powers in question were prepared to pocket this smack in the face, then Germany would be satisfied, because such a defeat would mean that the Triple Entente would never be able to work together again.

It is interesting to compare with this opinion those of two leading newspapers:

(1.) "We understand that the German Government is not absolutely hostile to England's endeavours to bring about a mediation between the contending Powers by those not directly interested in the conflict. But the German Government makes its participation in the mediation dependent upon whether Austria-Hungary would accept this procedure, and in which respect Austria wishes the mediation to follow. The German Government cannot support any action which Austria-Hungary does not desire, as that would mean exercising pressure.

"From Sir Edward Grey's declaration in the House of Commons it is clear that he was not thinking of mediation between Austria and Serbia, but between Austria and Russia. This shade of meaning requires attention. We think that any attempt at mediation between Austria and Serbia would have no prospect of success, because in Vienna they do not seem inclined to accept such an action. Diplomatic relations have not been broken off; the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs confers still with the Austrian Ambassador, and it is not easy to see why the other Powers Should not further this discussion in a mediative sense.

"But then Sir Edward Grey gave his idea more exact form and proposed a conference between the German, Italian and French ambassadors and himself. This conference of ambassadors is to seek a basis for an agreement and then submit the result to the cabinets in Vienna and St. Petersburg. In his yesterday's speech he emphasized the point that no hostilities may take place till the conference has concluded its work.

"Here, of course, is the difficulty which mars his plan, for it is questionable whether Austria will consent to a postponement of her military operations. Negotiations concerning Sir Edward Grey's proposal are at present occupying the cabinets, and it is to be hoped that a means will be found to make it acceptable to the Powers most interested in the conflict."[4]

[Footnote 4: Berliner Tagtblatt, July 28th.]

(2.) "Germany not only cherishes, in a platonic manner, the desire of the Western Powers to prevent the conflict between Austria and Serbia spreading to the great Powers, but the Berlin cabinet has already been active in more than one European capital in favour of a mediation which will secure European peace. In this respect we are pleased (Man begrüsst es hier) that, in consequence of Sir Edward Grey's initiative, the mediation idea has assumed an official form and is open for public discussion. There is, however, reason to doubt whether a conference between four great Powers as an organ for the mediation is the most suitable way out of the difficulty. Everyone is quite agreed that the details of the Austro-Serbian conflict, which concerns these two States alone, cannot be brought before the forum of a conference; but as regards the removal in good time of any difficulties which may arise between Austria and Russia, the question must be raised as to whether the Governments of these States are willing to entrust an official mediation to a conference of four other great Powers. For the success of the mediation proposal it would be more practical if the means to this end were made as simple as possible, and that use was made of the current diplomatic discussions, in immediate communication with the capitals of the Empires in question, in order to carry through a mediatory action to the result desired on all sides.

"In the employment of these means Germany would not fail to support the Western Powers as she has already done up to the present."[5]

[Footnote 5: Kölnische Zeitung, July 28th.]

I have carefully searched the official publications of the Central Powers (Germany's White Book; Austria's Orange Book), and can find no record in them of any pacific action on Germany's part in either of the European capitals; hence the claims made in the above article seem to be an exaggeration.

It appears incredible that these Powers should have omitted to give proof of such action when making their case public for the sole purpose of proving their innocence before the world. On the other hand, the impression given by these books is that Germany and Austria's attitude was:

To SERBIA: The conditions must be accepted ad hoc to the smallest tittle and comma. Alternative, war.

To RUSSIA: What we have determined upon is unalterable and inevitable, and you must submit to this decision. Alternative, war.

The Görlitzer Nachrichten published the following paragraph on July 30th: "Vienna, July 29th. After having made inquiries in official circles, the morning papers make this announcement: Count Berchtold has informed the English Ambassador that the Austro-Hungarian Government is grateful for Grey's mediation proposal, and appreciates the good intentions of the British Government. A peaceful solution of the conflict with Serbia is, however, no longer possible, as the declaration of war had already been signed."

Before leaving this all-important episode, it is instructive to compare three other versions of the reason for refusing a conference. Sir Edward Grey mooted the proposal for a conference to the ambassadors in London on Friday, July 24th. On the afternoon he requested the British Ambassador in Berlin to propose the conference to the German Government.

In spite of this, document No. 12 in the German White Book, a telegram from the German Chancellor to Prince Lichnowsky in London runs: "We know nothing here of a proposal from Sir Edward Grey to hold a conference of four in London, etc." Another telegram, document No. 15, bearing the same date and likewise from Bethmann-Hollweg to Lichnowsky is as follows: "We have immediately commenced the mediatory action in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey. Furthermore, we have informed Count Berchtold of M. Sasonow's desire to communicate with him direct."[6]

[Footnote 6: This message leads to the assumption that direct communications between Vienna and Petrograd had already ceased, although the Kölnische Zeitung told the German public on the following day that they had not.]

The next document in the German White Book is dated July 28th. It is a telegram from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German Chancellor in Berlin. "Count Berchtold begs me to express his thanks to you for communicating the English mediation proposal. He