replies, however, that in consequence of the commencement of hostilities by Serbia and after the declaration of war which has meanwhile been made he must look upon England's step as being too late."

In the Austrian Orange Book, p. 122, we find this passage in a telegram from Count Berchtold to the Austrian representative in London: "When Sir Edward Grey speaks of the possibility of avoiding an outbreak of hostilities he is too late, for yesterday Serbians shot at our frontier guards, and to-day we have declared war on Serbia."

There are two points in these telegrams which require explanation. Firstly, why should Sir Edward Grey's proposal take so long to reach Vienna. Apparently it took from Monday to Wednesday to go by telegram from London via Berlin to Vienna. Two German newspapers (already quoted) knew of this conference idea on the 27th of July and commented upon it in their morning editions of the following day.

The other point is the Austrian statement that Serbia commenced hostilities. If this were the case, one would expect that Austria-Hungary, in declaring war subsequently to the alleged shooting by Serbians at frontier guards, would make mention of the acts as a casus belli. On p. 117 of the Red Book the text of the declaration of war is given in full, but there is no mention of any resort to arms on the part of Serbia.

We are forced to the conclusion that Germany and Austria are mutually responsible for preventing the conference; they desired war, and a conference might have preserved peace. During the present summer (1915) an important work has been published in Germany from which the following passage is taken:

"Grey thought the time had now arrived to formulate a mediation proposal. This idea was from the very beginning unacceptable to Austria, because that would indirectly be a recognition of Russia as an interested Power in the Austro-Serbian conflict. Only those who have followed the development of mutual obligations between the Entente Powers are able to understand the role which Russia's two comrades (France and England)—to say nothing at all of Italy—would have played in this conference. During its sittings Russia would have continued her military preparations, while Germany would have been pledged not to mobilize. Finally, nobody could assert that the man (Sir Edward Grey) who would have presided over these negotiations, could have been impartial. The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more clearly one recognizes that it would have made for a diplomatic victory of the Triple Entente."[7]

[Footnote 7: Professor Hermann Oncken: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," pp. 545-6.]

Even the claim that Austria showed some inclination to permit mediation on the points in her ultimatum to Serbia which were incompatible with Serbia's sovereignty, has been categorically denied. The Vienna Fremdenblatt for September 24th, 1914, contains this official announcement:

"Vienna, September 24th. In a report of the late British Ambassador published by the British Government, there is a passage which maintains that Austria-Hungary's Ambassador, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg had informed Monsieur Sasonow, Russia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary 'was willing to submit the points in her Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with Serbian independence, to mediation.'

"We have been informed officially that this statement is absolutely untrue; according to the nature of the step taken by the monarchy in Belgrade, it would have been absolutely unthinkable. The passage cited from the British Ambassador's report, as well as some other phrases in the same, are evidently inspired by a certain bias. They are intended to prove, by asserting that Austria-Hungary was prepared to yield on some points at issue, that German diplomacy was really responsible for the outbreak of war.

"Such attempts cannot obscure the truth, that Austria-Hungary and Germany concurred in the wish to preserve European peace. If this wish has not been fulfilled, and a European conflict has arisen out of a local settlement, it can only be ascribed to the circumstance that Russia first threatened Austria-Hungary and then Germany by an unjustifiable mobilization. By this she forced war upon the Central Powers and thus kindled a general conflagration."

In dealing with Germany's endeavours for peace Professor Oncken writes on p. 546 of "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg" ("Germany and the World War"): "The work of German diplomacy took the form of giving warnings and peaceful explanations." On July 26th she pointed out to the Russian Government that "preparatory military measures on Russia's part would compel Germany to take corresponding steps, viz., the mobilization of the army. Mobilization means war." Oncken does not quote any of the "peaceful explanations" (friedliche Erklärungen), and much as the present writer would like to fill up this gap in his work, he must admit his utter inability, because in the diplomatic correspondence he can only find exasperating threats, thrown out to Russia by the two Germanic Empires.

The whole problem allows of a very simple digest: On July 23rd, Austria-Hungary handed her ultimatum to Serbia, therein stating her demands, and on the following day informed all the European powers of her attitude. The neutral Press of the world and an unusually large section of the German Press, immediately pronounced Austria's position to be indefensible and untenable. The German Government, in spite of these facts, gave its official and unreserved support to Austria's attitude on July 26th. After eight weeks of war (on September 25th), Austria officially declared that she had never swerved from her original claims, nor ever felt any inclination to do so.

It is true that the usages of everyday life do not always hold good in diplomatic dealings, but it is instructive to state the case in the terms of everyday affairs. Mr. A. (Austria) informs Mr. B. (Serbia) that he has a quarrel to settle with him and states his demands. Mr. C. (Russia) who is a relation, patron and friend of B.'s, interferes to see fair play. Whereupon Mr. D. (Germany), a friend and relation of A.'s, informs C. in unmistakable fashion that he must neither speak nor act in the affair or he will be immediately thrashed. Messrs. A. and D. are unanimous in this view and repeat the threat in mutual form. Meanwhile A. attacks B. Mr. C, seeing that they will not accord him a hearing, takes steps to compel them to hear him, at which point Mr. D. fulfils his threat and falls upon C.

It is not yet clear whether Austria would have permitted Russia to take over the rôle of adviser and second to Serbia in her unequal struggle with Austria. But from the moment Germany appeared on the scene the situation becomes perfectly simple: Russia has absolutely no right either to speak or move in the matter. On this rock of immovable Germanic obstinacy the Russian ship of State, was intended to meet with diplomatic shipwreck. Should Russia attempt to avoid this fate, then the German sword could be trusted to arrange matters in the way desired by Germany.

The German language contains a very expressive phrase, Stimmungsmacherei, which means creating or preparing a certain frame of mind. How Germany's public opinion was tuned to the war melody is seen by a study of the German newspapers published between July 25th and August 1st. A great part of the German nation had welcomed Austria's expressed determination to compel Serbia "to lick her shoes," as a London paper put it at the time. Only the Social Democratic Party persisted in asserting that Austria was the provocative and guilty party down to the evening of July 28th.

But three days earlier the process of educating public opinion against Russia commenced. In fact, it required little tuning to arouse a