id="footnotetag9"/>⁹

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Katha Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

The two next adhikaranas are of the nature of a digression. The passage about the a@ngushthamâtra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman: a question finally answered in the affirmative.—This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sûtra 28). In connexion herewith Sa@nkara treats of the nature of words (sabda), opposing the opinion of the Mîmâmsaka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-sensuous entity called 'sphota,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX; Sûtras 26-33).

Adhik. X (34-38) explains that Sûdras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidyâ.

Sûtra 39 constitutes, according to Sa@nkara, a new adhikarana (XI), proving that the prâna in which everything trembles, according to Katha Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the Sûtra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtras 24, 25, viz. that the a@ngusthamâtra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sûtras 24-39 form one adhikarana in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.—The a@ngusthmâtra is referred to twice in the Katha Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 ('the Person not larger than a thumb'). To determine what is meant by the a@ngusthmâtra, Râmânuja says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the a@ngusthmâtra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

The next Sûtra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to Sa@nkara it constitutes by itself a new adhikarana (XII), proving that the 'light' (jyotis) mentioned in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the Sûtra continues the preceding adhikarana, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Katha Up. II, 5, 15—a passage intermediate between the two passages about the a@ngushthamâtra—which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sûtra has in that case to be translated as follows: '(The a@ngushthamâtra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening between the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

The three last Sûtras of the pâda are, according to Sa@nkara, to be divided into two adhikaranas (XIII and XIV), Sûtra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms (Ch. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vijñânamaya, 'he who consists of knowledge,' of Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman.—According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras make up one single adhikarana discussing whether the Chandogya Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding ('Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' &c.). Sûtra 41 decides that 'the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else,' &c. (i.e. of something other than the individual soul; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.)—But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman?—(The two, Sûtra 42 replies, are different) 'because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different' (from the soul)—which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which Sa@nkara adduces;—and 'because such terms as Lord and the like' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all jagadvyâpâra is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

PÂDA IV.

The last pâda of the first adhyâya is specially directed against the Sâ@nkhyas.

The first adhikarana (1-7) discusses the passage Katha Up. I, 3, 10; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped—both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sâ@nkhya-sâstra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhâna.—Sa@nkara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Katha Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sâ@nkhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sûkshma sarîra), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Sa@nkara, that the tricoloured ajâ spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhâna of the Sânkhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power.—What Râmânuja in contradistinction from Sa@nkara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.

Adhik. III (11-13) shows that the pañka pañkajanâh mentioned in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sâ@nkhyas.—Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i.e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to Sa@nkara, meant to prove that 'he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.—The subject of the adhikarana is essentially the same in Râmânuja's view; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikarana being polemical against the Sâ@nkhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhâna doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikarana (VI; Sûtras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Râmânuja, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sâ@nkhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sâ@nkhya purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause