different from those of the army. Under the ancient monarchy, when the army was composed of the dissolute reduced to want, of malefactors pursued by the hand of justice, there did not, and could not, exist any affinity between the army and the nation: but now that the army is a national body, composed of the sons and brothers of our best citizens; and that these sons, these brothers, though separated from their families, remain united with them in heart, mind, and interests; the nation and the army are one. If the allies have founded their hopes solely on a disagreement of opinions and wishes between the nation and the army, they have calculated erroneously: the approach of their troops, far from dividing the French, will only draw their union closer. They will not fight for Napoleon, they will fight for the honour and independence of the nation."—"From what you tell me it would seem, that France is determined to run the hazard of war; and that it is ready, if Napoleon require it, to second as heretofore his schemes of conquest."—"No, sir: the glory of Napoleon has cost us too dear; we desire no more laurels at such a price. Napoleon has the wishes of the nation on his side, less from affection to his person, than because he is a man of the revolution, and his government will secure us pledges, which we have demanded in vain from the Bourbons; but if the Emperor were to suffer himself to be led away by the thirst of conquest, France would abandon him; and then you might reckon on M. Fouché and all true patriots uniting, to get rid of Napoleon for ever."—

"You do not think, then, it appears to me, that M. Fouché is disposed at the present moment, to second the views of the allied sovereigns and M. Metternich?"—"I do not; M. Fouché is convinced, that the Bourbons cannot reign: that the nation has an antipathy to them, which nothing can remove."—"The allies are not so much bent on restoring the crown to Louis XVIII., as on taking it from Napoleon, whose remaining on the throne is incompatible with the safety and repose of Europe: I am even authorized to think, that they would leave the French free to choose whatever sovereign, and whatever government, they might think proper. The Duke of Orleans, for instance, would not he suit the nation? He served formerly in the republican armies; he has been a partisan of the revolution; his father voted for the death of Louis XVI."—"The Duke of Orleans, no doubt, would offer the nation most of the pledges it requires: but his elevation to the throne, far from annihilating our troubles, would increase them; he would have against him the partisans of Louis XVIII., of Napoleon, and of the regency; that is to say, almost the whole nation."—"Well, then, the allies might consent to give you the young prince Napoleon and the regency, or perhaps a federal government."—"At the time of the invasion in 1814, we had several times occasion to debate the question of the regency with M. Fouché. He thought, that, with a regency, France would experience the renovation of those discords, to which minorities commonly give birth. A people, that has been at war with itself, and with its neighbours, has need of being swayed by a man, who knows how to hold the reins of government with a firm hand, and to make himself respected at home and abroad."—"But you have no want of firm and able men; and a council of regency might be composed for you, that would answer the wishes both of the allies and of France."—"I know well, that we have in the archchancellor, in the Duke of Vicenza, and in several of our principal functionaries, statesmen abounding in talents, wisdom, and moderation: but the difficulty would be, to make a choice among the military men. Most of these have equal rights, and their pretensions, their jealousies, their rivalries, could not but be fatal to our tranquillity."—"We should know how to keep them in order; and I do not see one among them whose ambition could prove formidable."—"Their ambition has not displayed itself for want of opportunity. I know but one military man, who could be placed at the head of the government with safety; this is Eugene, the prince who said, in 1814, in his memorable proclamations, that 'they alone are immortal, who know how to live and die faithful to their duty, faithful to gratitude and honour:' this prince, I say, far from aspiring to the throne, would be on the contrary its glory and support: but his family ties, and the duties they impose on him, perhaps would not permit him to quit Bavaria. Perhaps too the allies would not allow the direction of affairs in France, to be entrusted to him: do you think they would?"—"I am perfectly ignorant of what might be the determination of the prince and his family."—"But cannot you guess, what would be that of the allies?"—"Not in the least."—"What men," said I to him jocularly, "you diplomatists are! why are not you as open with me, as I am with you? have I left one of your desires unsatisfied? have I avoided answering one of your questions?"—"I am not endeavouring to dissemble, I assure you: but, as the question you have put to me was not foreseen, I cannot, and ought not, to allow myself to answer it."—"Well, we will say no more of it. As to a federal government, this would too much resemble our republic, and we have paid so dear for the honour of being republicans, that we have no farther inclination for it. A federal government may suit a country with a scanty population, like Switzerland; or a new nation, like America; but it would be a calamity to our old France: we are too volatile, too impassioned; we want a ruler, a master who knows how to make himself obeyed. Hark you, M. Werner, I must continue to speak to you frankly: the only chief, that suits us, is Napoleon: no longer Napoleon the ambitious and the conqueror, but Napoleon corrected by adversity. The desire of reigning will render him docile to the will of France, and of Europe. He will give them both such pledges, as they may require: and I believe the Duke of Otranto will then esteem himself very happy, to be able to concur with M. de Metternich in pacifying Europe, re-establishing harmony between Austria and France, and so restricting the power of the Emperor, that it shall no longer be possible for him, to disturb a second time the general tranquillity. This, I believe, must be the object of the allies; it depends on themselves alone to attain it: but if they reckon upon subjugating us by means of our intestine divisions, they will be deceived; of this you may assure M. de Metternich.

"For the rest, I shall give the Duke of Otranto an account of the overtures you have made me, and particularly of those relating to a regency: but, suppose we should consent to accept either one or the other of your proposals, what is to be done with Napoleon? for, as it is neither your intention, nor ours, to kill him, he must live; and where shall he live? Have the allies come to any determination on this point?"—"I do not know: M. de Metternich did not explain himself on this point: I will submit the question to him. I will acquaint him with your opinion of the state of France, and the situation of Napoleon, and of the possibility of a general arrangement: but I foresee, that the present sentiments of M. Fouché will astonish him greatly. He thought, that he detested Bonaparte."—"Men change with circumstances: M. Fouché may have detested the Emperor, when he tyrannized over France; yet be reconciled to him, since he has been willing to render it free and happy."

We parted, after having exchanged a few supplementary questions, and agreed to return with all speed, he to Vienna, and I to Paris; and to meet again at Bâle in the course of a week.