Winchester constituted but a part of those employed in this service. There was, of course, a considerable body of men at Harper's Ferry, with smaller bodies at Martinsburg, Romney, and New Creek, all intended to coöperate in the protection of the railroad.

A question of much interest had been started between General Halleck, the general-in-chief of the army, and General Schenck, the commander of the department, as to the best means of disposing the forces on this road, for its complete security. General Halleck thought the proper mode was to post his forces immediately on the line of the road, with blockhouses and other defences for resisting the attacks of the enemy. General Schenck, on the other hand, insisted upon holding a line some distance to the south, with a view of watching the enemy, and meeting his attacks before he reached the immediate vicinity of the road. This difference of opinion had been the subject of frequent discussion between these two officers, and gave rise to several telegraphic communications from General Halleck to General Schenck, which the former probably intended as orders, but which the latter, in view of their peculiar phraseology, considered to be merely advisory, and not having the character of peremptory orders. General Halleck expressed the decided opinion, if he did not actually command, that the main body of General Milroy's forces should be withdrawn from Winchester, and a small force only left as an outpost to watch the enemy. General Schenck, on the other hand, as he testified before the Court of Inquiry, believed that any small force left at that point must inevitably be captured; and he therefore determined to leave the whole garrison until the occasion should occur for its withdrawal. He therefore gave no order to General Milroy to evacuate his position until after the telegraphic wire had been cut, when it was too late to communicate with him. On the contrary, the last order received from General Schenck, at Winchester, was to hold the position and await further orders.

The solicitude about the forces at Winchester arose from the anticipated movements of Lee's rebel army. After the disastrous battle of Chancellorsville, it soon became the subject of universal apprehension that the victors in that field would make an attempt upon Washington, and with that ultimate object would invade Maryland and Pennsylvania. In the early days of June, the movements of the enemy on the Rappahannock indicated some aggressive design, though the precise nature of the enterprise about to be undertaken was unknown to our military authorities, who waited with much anxiety for its development. A great raid across the Potomac by Stuart's famous cavalry was anticipated; but its inception was thought to have been seriously embarrassed, if not wholly thwarted, by the several attacks of our own forces, especially by that at Beverly Ford. Still the mysterious movements of the rebel army perplexed our generals, while a distinct impression prevailed everywhere that the Confederates were about to advance northward, menacing Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia.

While this state of uncertainty mystified the General-in-chief, as he sat at the centre of his converging lines of telegraphic wires, and paralyzed the movements of the Army of the Potomac, there began to be an unusual activity of the rebel forces on the several roads leading through the passes of the Blue Ridge, in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Winchester. It was on Friday, the 12th day of June, that the first indications were seen of the approach of the enemy in force. On that day a strong reconnoitring party from Winchester was sent out on the Strasburg road, under command of Colonel Shawl, of the 87th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. This party consisted of Colonel Shawl's regiment of infantry, the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, and one section of Battery L, of the 5th regular artillery; and when its advance was within about two miles of Middletown, it encountered a superior force of cavalry drawn up in line of battle. By a well-concerted piece of strategy, the enemy was lured into pursuit until he fell into an ambush, and received the effective fire both of our artillery and infantry from a dense wood within one hundred yards of the road. Repulsed and pursued by our cavalry, the enemy retreated in confusion, and in this handsome little affair lost no less than fifty in killed and wounded, and thirty-seven prisoners. These prisoners all proved to be part of the rebel forces which had long been in the valley, and thus served to allay all apprehension of the approach of any part of Lee's army from that direction.

Another reconnoissance, under Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, of the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry, was sent out on the Front Royal road on the same day. On his return, this officer reported a large force of the enemy, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, at Cedarville, twelve miles from Winchester; but as the accounts of officers present, and of reliable scouts, were contradictory, and as it did not appear that he had taken the precautions necessary to enable him to ascertain the strength and character of the enemy, the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Moss was discredited. Nevertheless, on Friday night, the pickets around Winchester were doubled, and strong cavalry patrols were kept out on all the principal roads. A messenger was also sent to Colonel McReynolds, who commanded the 3d brigade at Berryville, notifying him that the enemy was reported to be in force on the Front Royal road, and ordering him to reconnoitre in that direction, to be in readiness to move, and in case of serious attack, to fall back on Winchester. It was also arranged that upon the firing of the four large guns in the fort at Winchester he was to march immediately to that place. Accordingly, on Saturday morning, at about 8 o'clock, the enemy was reported to be approaching on the Front Royal road, and the concerted signal was given for the return of the 3d brigade, under Colonel McReynolds, to unite with the main forces at Winchester. Berryville is on the direct road from Winchester to Harper's Ferry, about twenty miles from the latter place, and ten from the former. The 3d brigade, under Colonel McReynolds, consisting of his own regiment, the 1st New York Cavalry, commanded by Major A. W. Adams, the 6th Indiana Infantry, the 67th Pennsylvania Infantry, and the Baltimore battery, Captain Alexander, had been stationed at Berryville, to keep open the road to Harper's Ferry, and to watch the passes of the Blue Ridge and the fords of the Shenandoah river in that direction.

When this part of General Milroy's forces was thus ordered to join him at Winchester, it was not known or suspected that any portion of General Lee's army was in the valley. The movement was made with a view to concentrate the command, and to repel an attack from that portion of the enemy's forces which were known to have been in that vicinity for many months. It was deemed possible that Stuart's cavalry might have crossed the Blue Ridge, as had been apprehended, but there was no intention to abandon the position upon the approach of such an enemy. Indeed it was believed that, even if Stuart had entered the valley, his advance on Winchester would prove to be a mere feint to enable the main body of his forces to cross into Maryland.

Winchester is not a place of any strategic importance; nor is it easily to be held against a greatly superior force. It is approachable on all sides by numerous roads, without any difficulty of intercommunication. But there are some strong positions near the place susceptible of fortification; and several of these had been very skilfully improved by General Milroy, during his occupation of the post—not with any view, however, of attempting to hold it, in case of an attack by overwhelming numbers, but to resist any sudden concentration of the forces which were known to be in the valley or likely to invade it. These