brigade; Colonel Ely, of the 18th Connecticut, 2d brigade; and Colonel McReynolds, of the 1st New York Cavalry, 3d brigade, were called into consultation. The critical condition of the command was perfectly understood. In pursuance of orders previously received, which looked to the early evacuation of the place, most of the stores had been sent away. The communication with Martinsburg, from which supplies had been obtained always in a few hours, had been cut off; and it now appeared that the stock of ammunition had been very nearly expended, and the men were already on half rations. It was therefore resolved to retreat from the forts at one o'clock in the morning (of Monday 15th June), abandoning everything except the horses, and such supply of ammunition as each man could take upon the march. There was some question as to the feasibility of taking the field artillery; but as the enemy's pickets were within two or three hundred yards of the rifle pits, and as the forts were located on a rocky ridge, which could not well have been descended by the guns without arousing the enemy, it was finally determined to spike and leave them.

The fortifications had been constructed on the ridge, extending northwest from the town; and the guns in position commanded the Martinsburg road to the extent of their range. Probably on this account the enemy had not made his appearance in that direction; and this road, therefore, seemed to offer the only means of escape. The council of war resolved to march by this road to the point whence diverges a cross road to Summit Point, and thence by that place to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry. The three brigades were directed to go out in the order of their numbers, the 1st New York Cavalry, of the 3d brigade, being placed in the extreme rear. Notwithstanding the great precautions taken to elude the enemy immediately in front of the forts, the chief apprehension was that these forces would follow and harass the column on its retreat.

At two o'clock, on the morning of Monday, June 15th, with the most perfect silence, and in extreme darkness, the fortifications were evacuated, and the command of General Milroy commenced its march in the order and by the route designated. The bold and energetic resistance of the day previous had led the enemy to expect a renewal of the contest on Monday morning. Hence he was completely deceived and eluded; and the head of the retreating column had proceeded four and a half miles from Winchester, when suddenly, while it was yet quite dark, it encountered Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, eight or ten thousand strong, posted at the junction of the roads to Martinsburg and Summit Point. The commanding general, expecting only an attack from behind, was near the rear when the firing began. He immediately hastened to the scene of action, and in riding up to the front, and passing Colonel McReynolds, some distance ahead of his troops, ordered him to go back and hurry up his brigade. The forces of the 1st and 2d brigades were at once thrown into line of battle, the former on the left and parallel with the Martinsburg road, and the latter at right angles with the road, facing the woods in which the enemy were posted. The first brigade, by a gallant charge, succeeded in driving the enemy from their guns; the second, led by General Milroy in person, was three times repulsed by greatly superior numbers. Pending these successive charges, during which General Milroy's horse was shot under him, he awaited the arrival of the 3d brigade, and sent repeated messengers to order it up. His purpose was only to engage the enemy long enough to enable the whole column to pass away under cover of the severe blow he had given the enemy in the first charges of the two brigades engaged. But, unfortunately, the only part of the 3d brigade which could be found upon the field was the 1st New York Cavalry, which had been drawn up in line of battle by Major Adams, without having received any orders from the brigade commander. The rest of the brigade had gone to the right in the early part of the conflict, and, with the exception of the 6th Maryland Volunteers, became disorganized and scattered. Colonel McReynolds himself became separated from his troops, and reached Harper's Ferry alone, among the first who arrived.

Thus thwarted in his plans by the failure of the 3d brigade to respond to the orders given; the commanding general was compelled to continue the retreat with only the regiments which were yet upon the field. General Elliotts's forces, being in advance, mostly escaped. Colonel Ely himself was captured with a considerable number of his men; and the delay of the 3d brigade, giving the enemy the full advantage of his superiority in numbers, enabled him to cross the Martinsburg road in pursuit, and cause the remaining part of the command to separate into two parts, one of which, under the commanding general, made its way to Harper's Ferry; and the other, pushed too far to the left, was compelled to retreat upon Hancock, and thence into Pennsylvania. The first of these divisions pursued the Martinsburg road beyond the field of battle, and diverged thence through fields and by-roads to Harper's Ferry. The 3d brigade, with the exception of the 1st New York Cavalry, left the Martinsburg road before reaching the position of the enemy, and, by making a detour back toward Winchester, effected its escape to Charlestown, not, however, without a considerable loss of men captured by the enemy.

It has been ascertained, from prisoners since taken by our army, that the rebel force thus encountered at the junction of the Martinsburg and Summit Point roads, on the morning of the 15th June, had then just reached this position; and at the time when General Elliott drove the enemy from their guns, Johnson and his staff were nearly surrounded, between the 1st and 2d brigades of General Milroy's forces, and were in imminent danger of being captured. If the 3d brigade had taken part in the action, in obedience to the orders given, doubtless this important capture might have been made; and the retreat, which has been pronounced a disastrous failure, would have been crowned with brilliant success. Upon such events, often hang the fortunes of men and armies!

But notwithstanding the derangement of plans, and the want of coöperation in conducting this retreat, the result was by no means so disastrous as has been generally supposed. Out of 6,900 effective men who marched from Winchester, a little more than 6,000 escaped the enemy, and although scattered in different directions, were found to be on duty when recently the subject was investigated by order of Major-General Schenck.

Most extravagant representations have been made as to the loss of stores and ammunition by this evacuation. But the inquiry has established that a large part of the wagons had been previously sent away in safety, that very few stores were on hand, and that the ammunition was nearly exhausted. The horses were all taken on the retreat, and notwithstanding some confusion and disorder among the teamsters, were mostly saved to the Government. The guns left in the fortifications, and the empty wagons, constituted the principal loss; and these, in comparison with amounts of public property which during the war have been abandoned at many other places, without comment or complaint, were truly insignificant.

In estimating this affair, it cannot be fairly characterized as either disgraceful or particularly disastrous. The movements of Lee's army were wholly unknown in advance either to General Schenck, or to the General-in-chief of the army. The little force at Winchester, without any warning, was called upon to encounter the advance of Lee's army in overwhelming numbers. Without at first knowing or suspecting the character of the enemy, General Milroy held this gathering force at bay and in check for three days; and when finally surrounded and compelled to cut his way out, did so with a loss of less