obtain intelligence from those of his officers “who went alongside the enemy’s ship,” and who would naturally be detained as prisoners of war? It was impossible for anybody to reach Southampton in the time specified; nevertheless he did obtain such information. One of his officers—George T. Fullam, an Englishman unfortunately—came to the Kearsarge in a boat at the close of the action, representing the Alabama to be sinking, and that if the Kearsarge did not hasten to get out boats to save life, the crew must go down with her. Not a moment was to be lost, and he offered to go back to his own vessel to bring off prisoners, pledging his honour to return when the object was accomplished. After picking up several men struggling in the water, he steered directly for the Deerhound, and on reaching her actually cast his boat adrift. It was subsequently picked up by the Kearsarge. Fullam’s name appears amongst the list of “saved” by the Deerhound; and he, with others of the Alabama’s officers who had received a similar permission from their captors, and had similarly broken their troth, of course gave the above information to their veracious Captain.

The chain-plating of the Kearsarge was decided upon in this wise. The vessel lay off Fayal towards the latter part of April, 1863, on the look out for a notorious blockade-runner, named the “Juno.” The Kearsarge being short of coal, and, fearing some attempts at opposition on the part of her prey, the first officer of the sloop, Lieutenant-commander James S. Thornton, suggested to Captain Winslow the advisability of hanging her two sheet-anchor cables over her sides, so as to protect her midship section. Mr. Thornton had served on board the flag-ship of Admiral Farragut, the “Hartford” when she and the rest of the Federal fleet ran the forts of the Mississippi to reach New Orleans; and he made the suggestion at Fayal through having seen the advantage gained by it on that occasion. I now copy the following extract from the log-book of the Kearsarge:

This operation of chain-armouring took three days, and was effected without assistance from the shore and at an expense of material of seventy-five dollars (£15). In order to make the addition less unsightly, the chains were boxed over with ¾-inch deal boards, forming a case, or box, which stood out at right angles from the vessel’s sides. This box would naturally excite curiosity in every port where the Kearsarge touched, and no mystery was made as to what the boarding covered. Captain Semmes was perfectly cognizant of the entire affair, notwithstanding his shameless assertion of ignorance; for he spoke about it to his officers and crew several days prior to the 19th of June, declaring that the chains were only attached together with rope-yarns, and would drop into the water when struck with the first shot. I was so informed by his own wounded men lying in the naval hospital at Cherbourg. Whatever might be the value for defence of this chain-plating, it was only struck once during the engagement, so far as I could discover by a long and close inspection. Some of the officers of the Kearsarge asserted to me that it was struck twice, whilst others deny that declaration: in one spot, however, a 32-pounder shot broke in the deal covering and smashed a single link, two-thirds of which fell into the water. The remainder is in my possession, and proves to be of the ordinary 5¼-inch chain. Had the cable been struck by the rifled 120-pounder instead of by a 32, the result might have been different; but in any case the damage would have amounted to nothing serious, for the vessel’s side was hit five feet above the water-line and nowhere in the vicinity of the boilers or machinery. Captain Semmes evidently regarded this protection of the chains as little worth, for he might have adopted the same plan before engaging the Kearsarge; but he confined himself to taking on board 150 tons of coal as a protection to his boilers, which, in addition to the 200 tons already in his bunkers, would bring him pretty low in the water. The Kearsarge, on the contrary, was deficient in her coal, and she took what was necessary on board during my stay at Cherbourg.

The quantity of chain used on each side of the vessel in this much-talked-of armouring is only 120 fathoms, and it covers a space amidships of 49 ft. 6 in. in length, by 6 ft. 2 in. in depth.[3] The chain, which is single, not double, was and is stopped to eye-bolts with rope-yarn and by iron dogs.[4] Is it reasonable to suppose that this plating of 1⁷⁄10-inch iron (the thickness of the links of the chain) could offer any serious resistance to the heavy 68-pounder and the 7 in. Blakely rifle of the Alabama—at the comparatively close range of 700 yards? What then becomes of the mistaken remark of the Times that the Kearsarge was “provided, as it turned out, with some special contrivances for protection,” or Semmes’ declaration that she was “iron-clad?” “The Career of the Alabama,” in referring to this chain-plating, says—“Another advantage accruing from this was that it sank her very low in the water, so low in fact, that the heads of the men who were in the boats were on the level of the Kearsarge’s deck.” It is simply ridiculous to suppose that the weight of 240 fathoms of chain could have any such effect upon a vessel of one thousand tons burden; whilst, in addition, the cable itself was part of the ordinary equipment of the ship. Further, the supply of coal on board the Kearsarge at the time of action was only 120 tons, while the Alabama had 350 tons on board.

The objection that the Alabama was short-handed does not appear to be borne out by the facts of the case; while, on the other hand, a greater number of men than were necessary to work the guns and ship would be more of a detriment than a benefit to the Kearsarge. The latter vessel had 22 officers on board, and 140 men: the Alabama is represented to have had only 120 in her crew, (Mr. Mason’s statement,) but if her officers be included in this number, the assertion is obviously incorrect, for the Kearsarge saved 67,[5] the Deerhound 41, and the French pilot-boats 12, and this, without mentioning the 13 accounted for as killed and wounded,[6] and others who went down with the ship. When the Alabama arrived at Cherbourg, her officers and crew numbered 149. This information was given by captains of American vessels who were held as prisoners on board the privateer after the destruction of their ships; and their information is indorsed by the captured officers of the Alabama now on board the