filled with news, and were eagerly read by those at home who knew nothing of war: the Potomac army has moved and will soon be engaged in deadly strife with the enemy, and the war will soon be over. Such reports were daily published, and by the people were believed. It was thought by them that Lee was so badly whipped at Gettysburgh that he would not fight; but they were mistaken, the rebel army was recruited, re-organized, and as full of fight as ever, their leaders determined on independence or extermination. The forward movement had now commenced.

The next day the troops marched five miles in line of battle, in a dense wood. The equinoctial storm now came on, and the troops were ordered into camp near Culpepper, remaining there twenty-three days, watching the movements of the enemy strongly entrenched on the Rapidan. Pickets were thrown out and camp life again commenced. Why the halt, none of the men could tell, and for twenty-three days, drills, inspections and reviews were in regular succession. This suited the men better than marching, although tired of drilling. The 14th had not as yet lost any men by battle, but a great many by sickness and death. Of the 950 able-bodied men that had left New Jersey, 110 of them had died and were buried in Maryland and Pennsylvania, and a few in Virginia. Eight hundred and forty strong, the regiment occupied a large space of ground, encamping in five lines, two companies in one line, or, as was called, regimental divisions. The companies were in line as follows: A, F, D, I, C, H, E, K, G and B. A on the right was called the senior company, B on the left the second, and C centre or color company; the color guard was composed of one Sergeant and eight Corporals, whose duty it was to protect the flag.

On the morning of the 22d of September, eight days' rations were issued the men at two o'clock, and orders given to move at daylight. Tents were packed and everything in readiness, when the order was countermanded, the tents again placed on a line. The pickets were doubled, as it was supposed the enemy was advancing, and were about to attack; but this was soon forgotten, and vigilance again relaxed.

Winter quarters were now talked of by the men, as cold weather was approaching; they could scarcely keep warm in small shelter tents. Wood was very scarce and had to be carried some distance. The cold winds of October had come; extra blankets and overcoats were issued to protect the men from the cold. Forty-two dollars per year were allowed the men for clothing, and if they over-ran the amount, the difference was paid by them; if not drawn, the government paid the balance due the men.

On the 10th of October everything was quiet in camp. The various regiments were out on drill, when suddenly the long roll was beaten, and the troops, in double quick time, proceeded to camp. Orderlies were now running in every direction, everything in confusion, as the enemy were advancing in force. A line of battle was soon formed, extending some 15 miles. Our pickets were driven in, and the rebels were slowly advancing. Remained in line one hour, with arms stacked, the men lying on the grass awaiting orders. Returned to camp and packed up, ready to move, as the enemy had crossed the Rapidan and were advancing in force. At noon the troops moved, maneuvering in various directions. As yet no decisive order had been given, as it was not known what Lee's intentions were. The regiment marched three miles, halting in the camp the 6th N. J. had occupied, their camp showing signs of having been left in haste. The majority of the men being on picket, wagons were sent for their knapsacks. At ten o'clock the men pitched their shelters to get, if possible, a little sleep. Tents were up but a short time when orders came to pack up and move. The men formed in line but did not move, and lay on the ground until morning by camp fires, when the men again fell in, the day being Sunday, and marched in retreat, a forced march, the enemy following firing on our rear guard. Several times during the retreat a line of battle was formed by our men to protect the rear. Lee had been heavily re-enforced by troops sent from Bragg's army in the southwest, and was following closely, as the men remarked, "tight to our heels," destroying the railroad, burning bridges, etc. At Brandy station, the cavalry under Buford made a gallant charge, driving their advance guard back to Culpepper. The 106th N. Y. of third division, being on picket, were nearly surrounded, fighting their way out with small loss. Both armies were now using every exertion, part of the time Lee's army on a line with ours, moving for Centreville Heights. Arriving at the Hazel river, the troops were obliged to wait until pontoons were built, halting in line of battle, the rear guard skirmishing with the enemy during the entire march. The troops soon filed over on two bridges, which were taken up as soon as the army passed, the rebels laying theirs shortly after. Darkness now came on, and still the march was continued; the men, tired and weary often halting, forming line of battle, moving back and then advancing. At ten o'clock the Rappahannock was reached, the night very dark and cold; the men were compelled to wade the river waist deep, the water running rapidly. The troops halted on the banks of the river, having marched twenty-one miles since morning. A line of battle was now formed and a heavy picket force thrown out. The 14th Regiment was detailed, and orders given the men to light no fires nor to sleep. Chilled through, the men stood all night in their wet clothes. Several refused to cross the river and were taken prisoners the next day. At first it was supposed the enemy would not follow any farther than the river, but we were mistaken. All day Monday the men remained on picket, watching the movements of the enemy. At Fox's Ford, the 1st New Jersey cavalry were engaged for several hours, keeping the enemy at bay. The fords were all heavily guarded by the cavalry, and skirmishing was continually kept up. All was quiet in our immediate front, while the deep booming of the cannon was heard at intervals during the day on the extreme right or left. Our base of supplies was at Alexandria. The retreat had thus far been admirably conducted by Gen. Meade. Being afraid to hazard a battle against such odds, it was deemed expedient to retreat within the defenses of Washington, and with the troops there encamped to fight if necessary. It was now evident that it was Lee's intention to make a grand raid in the rear of the Army of the Potomac; cutting off railroad communication with Washington by destroying the bridges; securing supplies for his half famished troops and horses by seizing scattering wagon trains; and then by rapid marches throw his main force upon different points, and, if possible, destroy Gen. Meade's army by detail. When this flank movement was discovered Gen. Meade ordered a rear movement east of Culpepper, by Kilpatrick's and Buford's divisions of cavalry, with infantry supports. A. P. Hill's rebel corps had advanced on our north flank, towards Warrenton, threatening our right. Finding that Ewell's corps had not pursued us to the river, Gen. Meade sent three corps and Buford's cavalry towards Culpepper, but found no heavy force of the enemy there, Lee having by this time pushed his main column towards Warrenton, threatening our right and rear, while we were on the Rappahannock watching a portion of one of his corps. Lee hoped to execute his well-planned movement upon our rear, but our reconnoisance towards Culpepper led him to believe that it was Gen. Meade's intention to get in his rear. Instead of moving farther as he should have done, he halted his army, and took a position to give a decisive fight.

Up to this time Lee had the advantage, having surprised us while lying in camp. He was as near Washington as Gen. Meade, and unencumbered with trains, with every prospect of