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CHAPTER II On the Differentiation of the Human from the Anthropoid mind 30 § 1. Heredity, Adaptation, Accommodation 30-31 § 2. The Original Stock and the Conditions of Differentiation.—Mind of the higher apes the best clue to that of the original stock. Conditions of differentiation: the hunting life; geographical diffusion; social life; imaginations concerning Magic and Animism 31-5 § 3. Primal Society.—Forms of gregariousness amongst Mammalia; the hunting-pack most likely original of human society. Other conjectures 35-40 § 4. Psychology of the Hunting-pack.—Interest in the chase and in killing; gregariousness; various modes of sympathy; aggressiveness; claim to territory; recognition of leaders, submission to the pack, emulation, precedency; strategy and persistence; struggle to share the prey; intelligence. Different mentality of the herbivorous herd 40-49 § 5. The Wolf-type of Man established by Natural Selection.—Keith’s hypothesis as to epoch of differentiation. Slow progress of culture; full adaptation to hunting life prior to Neolithic culture 49-52 § 6. Some further Consequences of the Hunting-life.—Growth of constructiveness; language; customs—marriage; property; war; sports and games; laughter and lamentation 52-61 § 7. Moralisation of the Hunters.—Character of Anthropoids; human benevolence; moral sense; effect of industry; of growing intelligence 61-6 § 8. Influence of the Imaginary Environment.—Belief in Magic and Spirits often injurious; but on the whole advantageous; especially by establishing government 66-70 CHAPTER III Belief and Superstition 71 § 1. “Superstition.”—Here used merely to include Magic and Animism as imagination-beliefs 71-2 § 2. Imagination.—Various uses of the word; mental “images”; in connection with reasoning; and with literary fiction. Here means unverifiable representation 72-6 § 3. Belief.—Nature of belief; degrees of probability; tested by action; play-belief 76-9 § 4. Causes and Grounds of Belief.—Derived from perception. Evidentiary causes, or grounds, raising some probability; and non-evidentiary causes which are not grounds. Memory, testimony, inference so far as unverifiable are imagination. Influence of apperceptive masses and of methodology. Non-evidentiary causes have their own apperceptive masses—derived from bad observation, memory, testimony; influenced by emotion, desire and voluntary action; by sympathy and antipathy, and by suggestibility 79-85 § 5. The Beliefs of Immature Minds.—Non-evidentiary causes more influential than with us; picture-thinking more vivid; no common standard of truth; feeble power of comparison, due perhaps to undeveloped brain 85-92 § 6.