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1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, 127 (a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their origin, 130 (b) Organic character of moral sentiments, 132 Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, 133 2. On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism, 134 (a) Social nature of the individual, 135 (b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, 141 (α) Continued existence of competition, 142 (β) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, 143 (γ) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, 143 (δ) Weakness of altruistic feelings, 146 (c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, 148 Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, 148 Nor of ethical hedonism, 150 3. On utilitarianism, 152 Modification of the utilitarian method, 153 And of its principle, 155 Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, 155 (a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, 156 (b) As a theory of consequences, 160 (c) As related solely to sensibility, 161   CHAPTER VII. HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM. 1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, 164 (a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of life, 164 (b) From interpreting life by pleasure, 165 2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure, 167 3. Objections to this argument, 168 (a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain, 169 (α) From the negative nature of pleasure, 171 (β) From the facts of human life, 172 (b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to pleasure, 172 (α) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument,