class="tdr">173
| (β) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery, |
175 |
| (aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious, |
176 |
| (bb) The nature of volition, |
177 |
| (cc) The facts of human progress, |
179 |
| Individual progress, |
179 |
| Social progress, |
181 |
| 4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to evolutionist ethics, |
186 |
| (a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, |
187 |
| (b) The conditions of pleasure and pain, |
190 |
| (c) Application of the theory of evolution, |
197 |
| |
| CHAPTER VIII. |
| THE EVOLUTIONIST END. |
| Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory of evolution, |
201 |
| 1. Adaptation to environment, |
203 |
| (a) As the end for present conduct, |
207 |
| Opposed to progress, |
207 |
| Does not fully represent evolution, |
209 |
| (b) As describing the ultimate condition of life, |
210 |
| Resultant absolute code, |
211 |
| (α) Abstract principles of social relation, |
212 |
| (β) Personal end only defined as adaptation, |
213 |
| (γ) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, |
213 |
| (c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, |
217 |
| 2. End suggested by the tendency to variation, |
221 |
| (a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation, |
222 |
| (b) Standard for measuring development found in complexity of act and motive, |
227 |
| (α) Antinomy between social and individual ends, |
231 |
| (β) Psychological defects, |
232 |
| 3. Development or increase of life as the end, |
236 |
| (a) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, |
242 |
| Cannot define life without an objective standard, |
244 |
| (b) Objective standard: defined in two ways, |
247 |
| (α) Conformity to the type, |
|