back down from her position? Her navy was supposed to be at least as powerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure strength with the United States was that England had accepted arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the United States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicely adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put to the test of actual war.

While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors. In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a field for the development of American commerce. The failure to cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both North and South America has been mainly with Europe. There has, therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powers of Europe in the field of South American commerce. Our interest has been political rather than commercial. We have prevented the establishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door. This situation has been in full accord with British policy. Had Great Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand commercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrine would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten. Americans should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the face of such a combination our navy would have been of little avail.

IV

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE

President Monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positive side. It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the Western Hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business. Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on grounds of expediency. Washington, as we have seen, regarded this policy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separate occasions was ready to form an alliance with England. Probably neither one of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirking its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations. Monroe's message contained the implied promise that if Europe would refrain from interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would abstain from all intervention in Europe. From that day until our entrance into the World War it was generally understood, and on numerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the United States would not resort to force on any question arising outside of America except where its material interests were directly involved. We have not refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, but it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by force. In the existing state of world politics this limitation has been a serious handicap to American diplomacy. To take what we could get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities. Diplomatic action without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished something in the world at large, so that American influence has by no means been limited to the western hemisphere.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery absorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen. The fact that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the American hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done. Slavery and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life, especially during the period from 1830 to 1860. As the movement against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of increasing our isolation. The effort of the American Colonization Society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near giving us a colony in Africa. In fact, Liberia, the negro republic founded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was in all essentials an American protectorate, though the United States carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing more than expressing its good will for the little republic. As Liberia was founded years before Africa became a field for European exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside interference, and the United States was never called upon to decide whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force.

The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the United States and England during the first half of the nineteenth century, and an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIII of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The only reason why the two countries had never been able to act in accord on this question before was that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right of impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of 1812. The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement which would permit British naval officers to search American vessels in time of peace. In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be a form of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there was no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and search ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flag which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. The United States stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view. In the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the two powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron "to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the slave trade." It was further agreed that the officers should act in concert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance.

The United States has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarian interest in the natives of Africa. In 1884 two delegates were sent to the Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized status to the Kongo Free State. The American delegates signed the treaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it was not submitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated as follows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8, 1885:

"A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might be kept open to the world's trade. Delegates attended on behalf of the United States on the understanding that their part should be merely deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so far as the United States