were concerned. This reserve was due to the indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign territories. The results of the conference were embodied in a formal act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories, subject to ratification within one year. Notwithstanding the reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended, their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the United States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we have no established interests or control.

"This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction of the Senate to that general act."

The United States also sent delegates to the international conference held at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave trade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa. The American delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed on the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo. The European representatives, being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals, framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the American delegates refused to sign. The latter did, however, affix their signatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression of the African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms, ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the African continent. In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American policy of isolation in the following resolution:

"That the United States of America, having neither possessions nor protectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or protectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the other powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and, for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution be inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States."

The United States has always stood for legality in international relations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration of international disputes. Along these lines we have achieved notable success. It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions of international law from questions of international politics. We have been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation. We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the land, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities that rested on us as a member of the society of nations. In fact, the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes the binding force of the law of nations and of treaties. As international law is the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of course, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and in the development of new law. When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up by the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, the United States was invited to give its adherence. The four rules embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of maritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains, abolished. Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Third, neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective. The United States Government was in thorough accord with the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters then stood, to commit itself to the first rule. It had never been our policy to maintain a large standing navy. In the War of 1812, as in the Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of the enemy. In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the declaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that the powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private property, except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in time of war. He said that if they would agree to this, the United States would agree to abolish privateering. The powers of Europe refused to accept this amendment. We refrained from signing the Declaration of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but because it did not go far enough.

During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomatic efforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy and the formation of hostile alliances. It made no effort to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded as an American question. The dispute with England over the Alabama Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted by the Treaty of Washington. The most significant feature of this treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of the "Alabama Claims," but which were to be binding upon England and the United States for the future. It was further agreed that these rules should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should be invited to accede to them. The rules forbade the fitting out, arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due diligence to prevent these things from being done. While these rules have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are generally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbent upon all neutrals.

When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar of Russia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, grave misgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men in public life. The participation of the United States with the powers of Europe in this conference was taken by many Americans to mark the end of the old order and the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy. The conference, however, was concerned with questions of general international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of any state, European or American. Lest there should be any misapprehension as to the historic policy of the United States, the final treaty was signed by the American delegation under the express reservation of a declaration previously read in open session. This declaration was as follows:

"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the