is as absolutely necessary to render us moral Agents, as a Capacity to discern right motives is.  These two are I think quite distinct perceptions, the former proceeding from a desire inseparable from a Conscious Being of its own happiness, the latter being only our Understanding, or Faculty of seeing Truth.  Since a disposition to be influenced by right motives is a sine quâ non to Virtuous Actions, an Indifferency to right motives must incapacitate us for Virtuous Actions, or render us in that particular not moral agents.  I do indeed think that no Rational Creature is strictly speaking Indifferent to Right Motives, but yet there seems to be somewhat which to all intents of the present question is the same, viz. a stronger disposition to be influenced by contrary or wrong motives, and this I take to be always the Case when any vice is committed.  But since it may be said, as you hint, that this stronger disposition to be influenced by Vicious Motives may have been contracted by repeated Acts of Wickedness, we will pitch upon the first Vicious Action any one is guilty of.  No man would have committed this first Vicious Action if he had not had a stronger (at least as strong) disposition in him to be influenced by the Motives of the Vicious Action, than by the motives

of the contrary Virtuous Action; from whence I infallibly conclude, that since every man has committed some first Vice, every man had, antecedent to the commission of it, a stronger disposition to be influenced by the Vicious than the Virtuous motive.  My difficulty upon this is, that a stronger natural disposition to be influenced by the Vicious than the Virtuous Motive (which every one has antecedent to his first vice), seems, to all purposes of the present question, to put the Man in the same condition as though he was indifferent to the Virtuous Motive; and since an indifferency to the Virtuous Motive would have incapacitated a Man from being a moral Agent, or contracting guilt, is not a stronger disposition to be influenced by the Vicious Motive as great an Incapacity?  Suppose I have two diversions offered me, both of which I could not enjoy, I like both of them, but yet have a stronger inclination to one than to the other, I am not indeed strictly indifferent to either, because I should be glad to enjoy both; but am I not exactly in the same case, to all intents and purposes of acting, as though I was absolutely indifferent to that diversion which I have the least inclination to?  You suppose Man to be endued naturally with a disposition to be influenced by Virtuous Motives, and that this Disposition is a sine quâ non to Virtuous Actions, both which I fully believe; but then you omit to consider the natural Inclination to be influenced by Vicious Motives, which, whenever a Vice is committed, is at least equally strong with the

other, and in the first Vice is not affected by Habits, but is as natural, and as much out of a man’s power as the other.  I am much obliged to your offer of writing to Mr. Laughton, which I shall very thankfully accept of, but am not certain when I shall go to Cambridge; however, I believe it will be about the middle of the next month.

I am, Rev. Sir,
Your most obliged humble Servant,

J. BUTLER.

Oriel, Oct. the 6th.

THE ANSWER.

Your objection seems indeed very dexterous, and yet I really think that there is at bottom nothing in it.  But of this you are to judge, not from my assertion, but from the reason I shall endeavour to give to it.

I think then, that a disposition to be influenced by right motives being what we call rationality, there cannot be on the contrary (properly speaking) any such thing naturally in rational creatures as a disposition to be influenced by wrong motives.  This can be nothing but mere perverseness of will; and whether even that can be said to amount to a disposition to be influenced by wrong motives, formally, and as such, may (I think) well be doubted.  Men have by nature strong inclinations to certain objects.  None of these inclinations are vicious, but vice consists in pursuing the inclination towards any object in certain

circumstances, notwithstanding reason, or the natural disposition to be influenced by right motives, declares to the man’s conscience at the same time (or would do, if he attended to it) that the object ought not to be pursued in those circumstances.  Nevertheless, where the man commits the crime, the natural disposition was only towards the object, not formally towards the doing it upon wrong motives; and generally the very essence of the crime consists in the liberty of the will forcibly overruling the actual disposition towards being influenced by right motives, and not at all (as you suppose) in the man’s having any natural disposition to be influenced by wrong motives, as such.

III.

From the original, now in the library at the British Museum.  [Add. MS. 12,101.]

Rev. Sir,

I had the honour of your kind letter yesterday, and must own that I do now see a difference between the nature of that disposition which we have to be influenced by virtuous motives, and that contrary disposition, (or whatever else it may properly be called,) which is the occasion of our committing sin; and hope in time to get a thorough insight into this Subject by means of those helps you have been pleased to afford me.  I find it necessary to consider such very abstruse questions

at different times and in different dispositions; and have found particular use of this method upon that abstract subject of Necessity: for tho’ I did not see the force of your argument for the unity of the Divine Nature when I had done writing to you upon that subject, I am now fully satisfied that it is conclusive.  I will only just add that I suppose somewhat in my last letter was not clearly expressed, for I did not at all design to say, that the essence of any crime consisted in the man’s having a natural disposition to be influenced by wrong motives.

I was fully resolved to have gone to Cambridge some time in this Term, not in the least expecting but that I might have the Terms allowed there which I have kept here, but I am informed by one who has been there that it is not at all to be depended upon; but that it’s more likely to be refused than granted me.  My design was this; when I had taken the Degree of Batchelor of Arts at Cambridge, (which I would have done to have the Priviledge of that Gown,) to take that of Batchelor of Law a year afterwards, but if I cannot have the Terms I have kept for Batchelor of Arts allowed there, it will be highly proper for me to stay at Oxford to take that degree here, before I go to Cambridge to take Batchelor of Law.  I will inquire concerning the truth of what the gentleman told me, and if I find he is mistaken and that I can take the degree of Batchelor of Arts at Cambridge

next June, which is the time I shall be standing for it, and Batchelor of Law a year after that; I will make bold to accept of your kind offer to write to Mr. Laughton, and will acquaint you with it as soon as I am satisfied,