occupation and fortifying of Coteau du Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a measure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.[23] The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake Ontario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Commander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more important points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no additional security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real importance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for defending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was occupied and fortified; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dearborn's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Lawrence, that post would have presented a formidable obstacle to the advance of the enemy.

The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post, has been considerably lessened[24] since the defence of the Canadas by the French, in consequence of the facility with which Lower Canada may now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or principal barrier between the two countries. The occupation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the reinforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Champlain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it.

Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did not do, by way of preparation for the defence of the Canadas before the war, the Reviewer proceeds to point out what was done by him after the commencement of hostilities. And here we find the same want of candour which distinguishes the remarks to which we have already adverted.[25]

In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it.

The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most violent opposition, by a comparatively small majority. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most affected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States at this time, that a contest undertaken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, without any sacrifice of national honor, so easily concede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short duration. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Prevost concurred. It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Commander of the forces. Under these circumstances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those measures of aggression against the British Provinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and disgrace. In his adherence to this defensive system, Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and situation to form a correct judgment on the propriety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in consequence of the inadequacy of the means possessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men; the law for embodying the militia had only been recently passed; and the population, which had been previously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to discipline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for