command from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence."

In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds—"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."

Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"[32] of Sir George Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been discretionary instead of positive. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in possession of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's detachment at the Moravian village.