passed between that office and its Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given in extenso, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German official defense it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from Berlin to Vienna and only two that passed from Vienna to Berlin.

This cannot be an accident. Germany has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them.

Until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.

Austria's Case Against Servia.

To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take us outside the documentary record and into the realm of disputed facts and would expand this discussion far beyond reasonable length.

Let us therefore suppose arguendo that our imaginary court would commence its consideration with the assumption that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, and that the murder of the Archduke on June 28, 1914, while in fact committed by Austrian citizens of Servian sympathies on Austrian soil, had its inspiration and encouragement in the political activities either of the Servian Government or of political organizations of that country.

The question for decision would then be not whether Austria had a just grievance against Servia, but whether having regard to the obligations which Austria, as well as every other country, owes to civilization, she proceeded in the right manner to redress her grievance.

On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo. For nearly a month there was no action by Austria, and no public statement whatever of its intentions. The world profoundly sympathized with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as years and wretched in both."

The Servian Government had formerly disclaimed any complicity with the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein.

From time to time, from June 28 to July 23, there came semi-inspired intimations from Vienna that that country intended to act with great self-restraint and in the most pacific manner. In his speech to the French Chamber of Deputies, Viviani says that Europe had in the interval preceding July 23 express assurances from Austria that its course would be moderate and conciliatory. Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of profound peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.

This is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English "White Paper" from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. It is one of the most significant documents in the entire correspondence. At the time this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and most unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna, and possibly in Berlin, and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

"asked the German Ambassador today (July 20) if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia." The German Ambassador replied "that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step."

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

"in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up."

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the German Ambassador that he

"assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial,"

and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.

[English "White Paper," No. 1.]

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on the theory that the true function of an Ambassador is "to lie for his country," or the thunderbolt was being launched with such secrecy that even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in progress.

The British Ambassador at Vienna reports to Sir Edward Grey:

"The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d July of the note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz."

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at Vienna—note the significance of the exception—not a single member of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Ambassador when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23 was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone was moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.

[Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.]

No better proof of this sense of security need be adduced than that the French President and her Foreign Minister were thousands of miles from Paris, and the Russian Minister had, after the funeral of the Austrian Archduke, left Vienna for his annual holiday.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance that

"the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to Germany a threatening attitude."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense in the German "White Paper," we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a carte blanche to proceed.

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's