attitude and pacific protestations that we quote in extenso. After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the German "White Paper" says:

"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally."

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir Edward Grey, states that on the preceding night (July 21) he had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two countries."

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian Minister emphasized the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."

[English "White Paper," No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments that

"the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action—a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of the whole business—yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"—why, if they were justified?—and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"

and he added that Germany strongly desired

"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated Governments of Germany a confidential communication in which he recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added that

"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone—

"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great European powers wish to localize."