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  CHAPTER I The Supreme Court of Civilization

Existence of the Court—The conscience of mankind—The philosophy of Bernhardi—The recrudescence of Machiavelliism—Treitschke and Bernhardi’s doctrine—Recent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown Prince, and representative officials—George Bernard Shaw’s defense—Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism

1   CHAPTER II The Record in the Case

The issues stated—Proximate and underlying causes—A war of diplomats—The masses not parties to the war—The official defenses—The English White Paper—The German White Paper—The Russian Orange Paper—The Belgian Gray Paper—Austria and Italy still silent—Obligation of these nations to disclose facts

18   CHAPTER III The Suppressed Evidence

No apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium—Suppression by Germany of vital documents—Suppression by Austria of entire record—Significance of such suppression

27   CHAPTER IV Germany’s Responsibility for the Austrian
Ultimatum

Silence which preceded ultimatum—Europe’s ignorance of impending developments—Duty to civilization—Germany’s prior knowledge of ultimatum—Its disclaimer to Russia, France, and England of any responsibility—Contradictory admission in its official defense—Further confirmation in Germany’s simultaneous threat to the Powers—Further confirmation in its confidential notice to States of Germany to prepare for eventualities

31   CHAPTER V The Austrian Ultimatum to Servia

Extreme brutality of ultimatum—Limited time given to Servia and Europe for consideration—Ultimatum and Servia’s reply contrasted in parallel columns—Relative size of two nations—Germany’s intimations to Servia—Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy—Disclaimer of intention to take territory valueless

47   CHAPTER VI The Peace Parleys

Possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor—Difficulties of peaceful solution not insuperable—Policy of Germany and Austria—Russia’s and England’s request for time—Germany’s refusal to coöperate—Germany’s and Austria’s excuses for refusal to give extension of time—Berchtold’s absence from Vienna—Austria’s alleged disclaimer of territorial expansion—Sazonof’s conference with English and French Ambassadors—Their conciliatory counsel [Pg xxxiii]to Servia—Servia’s pacific reply to ultimatum—Austria, without considering Servian reply, declares war—England proposes suspension of hostilities for peace parleys—Germany refuses—Its specious reasons—Germany’s untenable position as to localization of conflict—England’s proposal for a conference—Germany’s refusal—Austria declines all intervention, refusing to discuss Servian note—Germany supports her with a quibble as to name of conference—Russia proposes further discussion on basis of Servian note—Russia then again proposes European conference—Austria and Germany decline

61   CHAPTER VII The Attitude of France

The French Yellow Book—Its editors and contents—M. Jules Cambon—The weakness of German diplomacy—Cambon’s experience and merits—Interview between the German Kaiser and the King of Belgium—The Kaiser’s change of attitude—The influence of the Moroccan crisis—The condition of the German people in 1913—The suppression of news in Austria—Attitude of the military party—Servia’s warning to Austria—Germany’s knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its issuance—Italy’s ignorance of the Austrian ultimatum—Significance of the fact—Germany’s reasons for concealing its intentions from Italy—The policy of secrecy—Prince Lichnowsky’s anxiety—Cambon’s interview with von Jagow—The methods of deception—Sazonof’s frank offer—Germany’s attempt to influence France—Cambon’s dramatic interview with von Jagow—His plea “In the name of humanity”—The different attitudes of the two groups of powers

102   CHAPTER VIII The Intervention of the Kaiser

The Kaiser’s return to Berlin—His inconsistent record and complex personality—German Foreign Office deprecates his return—Its many blunders—The Kaiser takes the helm—He telegraphs the Czar—The Czar’s reply—The Kaiser’s second telegram—His untenable position—The Czar’s explanation of military preparations and pledge that no provocative action would be taken by Russia—King George’s telegram proposing temporary occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending further peace negotiations—The Kaiser’s reply—The Kaiser’s telegram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of military preparations—His insistence upon unilateral conditions—Germany’s preparations for war—Its offer to England to insure its neutrality—England’s reply—Russia’s offer to stop conditionally military preparations—England requests Germany to suggest any peace formula—Austria expresses willingness to discuss with Russia Servian note—Motives of Austria for this reversal of