policy—The Kaiser sends ultimatum to Russia—The Czar’s last appeal—The Kaiser’s reply—Russia’s inability to recall mobilization—England’s last efforts for peace—Germany declares war—The Czar’s telegram to King George

The verdict of history not affected by result of war—Belgium at outbreak of war—The Treaty of 1839—Its affirmation by Bismarck—France’s action in 1871—Reaffirmation by Germany of Belgian neutrality in 1911-1914—The Hague Peace Conference of 1907—England asks Germany’s and France’s intentions with respect to Belgium’s neutrality—France replies—Germany’s refusal to reply—Germany’s second offer to England—Germany’s ultimatum to Belgium—Belgium’s reply—France’s offer of five army corps—Belgium refuses aid—Germany’s declaration of war against Belgium—The German Chancellor’s explanation in the Reichstag—The Belgian King appeals to England—England’s ultimatum to Germany—The “scrap of paper” incident—England declares war against Germany—The apologies for Germany’s action discussed—Belgium’s rights independent of Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention—Germany’s allegation that France had violated Belgium’s neutrality an afterthought—Von Mach’s plea for the suspension of judgment—The Brussels documents discussed—The negotiations between England and Belgium—The German Chancellor’s belated explanation of the “scrap of paper” phrase—Invasion of Belgium a recrudescence of Machiavelliism—The great blunder of Germany’s diplomats and soldiers

The completeness of the evidence—The force of public opinion—The
judgment of neutral States—The United States as a moral arbiter—A
summary of the probable verdict of history

The Evidence in the Case

CHAPTER I

THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 1914, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity or shall we say commonplace, everyday morality, to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon, but by the eternal criterion of justice.

What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

It may be suggested that the question is academic, as no such Supreme Court exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man.

Casuists of the Bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further suggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with a false premise that such a thing as international morality exists, and that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid aside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that differs only in degree and not in kind from the methods of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in degree from those of Alaric and Attila. According to this theory, the only law of nations is that ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy: