End of the Continent to the other. Nay, what is still more, this supreme, controuling Power must be the only Center of Union throughout the Empire. Nothing besides is so much as proposed; and indeed nothing besides (when the parliamentary Connection is dissolved) can be sufficient to tie all the Parts together;—Parts so widely distant, so totally disjointed from each other, as the British Isles and the American Continent.

Now here again permit me to ask, Is not this a very alarming Circumstance even in Contemplation? And is all our boasted Zeal for Liberty to end at last only in that Union and Connection which can be procured to the several detached Parts of the Empire by Means of a Court, and of a standing Army?—A large standing Army to be kept up independently of the British Parliament!—And that too for the express Purpose of enforcing the Decrees and Arbitrations of the Court!

But this is not all; for even a standing Army would not be so formidable (because it would soon moulder away) were no Means to be found out for its Support and Maintenance: And this Scheme of many independent Parliaments points to the very Means of obtaining the necessary Supplies; for, as an ingenious Foreigner has very judiciously observed[7], “A Sovereign who depends, with regard to Supplies, on several Assemblies, in Fact depends upon none. An Agent for the American Colonies, [I suppose the Author meant Dr. Franklin] in his Examination before the House of Commons, (Anno 1766, P. 122) has even suggested in three Words the whole Substance of what I have endeavoured to prove on that Subject; when he said, The Granting Aids to the Crown is the only Means the Americans have of recommending themselves to their Sovereign. Nothing therefore could be more fatal to English Liberty (and to American Liberty in the Issue) than the Adoption of the Idea, cherished by the Americans, of having distinct independent Assemblies of their own, who should treat immediately with the King, and grant him Subsidies, to the utter Annihilation of the Power of those antient, and hitherto successful Assertors of general Liberty, the British Parliament.”

To these Reflections in this and in other Parts of his Book, the judicious Author adds many striking Examples, particularly the present State of the Want of Liberty in France and Spain, by way of confirming and corroborating his Argument. But in my humble Opinion there is still a more forcible Example to be drawn from the Case of the hereditary Dominions of the House of Austria. For it is well known, that the Princes of that House rule in as absolute a Manner over every Part of their vast Possessions as the Sovereigns either of France or Spain; and yet there are States (answering to our Parliaments) in almost every Country belonging to the Austrian Dominions; nay, these States are frequently summoned to meet together; which is not the Case with the general national Assemblies of France, or with the Cortes of Spain. How then comes it to pass,—that such Meetings produce little or no Effects in regard to the obtaining of a reasonable Degree of Liberty for the Subject, which every Subject, if in his right Senses, wishes to obtain? The Reason is obvious:—There are a Multitude of little States or Parliaments within the Territories of the House of Austria;—the States of Austria (not to mention the several still lesser States in the Netherlands) the States of Bohemia, States of Hungary, of Transilvania, Stiria, Carinthia, Carniola, &c. &c. But all these petty States, or Parliaments being totally independent of, and consequently Competitors with, and Rivals to each other, never can act in Concert, or pursue one general Plan, or attend to one common Interest:—So that the Power of the Prince, which would have been too weak to have contended with them all, if all had been UNITED (like the Parliament of Great-Britain) in one compact, and general Body,—becomes an Over-match for any one of them singly and disjointed from the rest:—And this is the true Reason, why the House of Austria governs all her Provinces with so high an Hand at this Day. In short, Divide et impera, explains the whole Mystery of this Affair:—And Great-Britain may here see her own Picture, drawn to the Life, if ever she should consent to the Erection of Parliaments in North-America, to be co-ordinate with her own; and at the same Time should allow these North-Americans to be Co-partners with herself in one common Empire.

But why do I labour to prove this Point? Mr. Burke himself is as conscious, as I can be, of the dreadful Effects, which must necessarily attend the Execution of his Scheme. Hear him therefore in his own Words:—[8]“We know that the Emulations of such Parties [to be created by the independent Parliaments of North-America] their Contradictions, their reciprocal Necessities, their Hopes and their Fears, must send them all in their Turns to him who holds the Balance of the State. The Parties are the Gamesters, but Government keeps the Table, and is sure to be the Winner in the End. When this Game is played, I really think, it is more to be feared, that the [American] People will be exhausted, than that Government will not be supplied.”

Now, my Lords and Gentlemen! be pleased to compare these Fears of Mr. Burke, “that the Americans will be too lavish in their Grants,—with the Hopes entertained by the Agent (just quoted from Monsieur De Lolme) that the Americans by Means of liberal Grants may recommend themselves to the good Graces of their Prince;”—and then you will have full Possession of all Dr. Franklin’s favourite Speculation for removing the Seat of Empire from hence to North-America, and for abandoning the British Isles to the Care of Deputies, Vice Roys, and Lord Lieutenants. Many of you, I make no Doubt, have heard him declare, that the great Continent of British America (which, according to his Computation, will contain nearly One Hundred Millions of Inhabitants in little more than a Century) ought to become the Seat of general Empire. And it might be easily gathered from the whole Turn of his Conversation, that he thought it no very difficult Matter in the Course of Things to bring this important Point to bear;—that is, to induce some future Sovereign of this Country to make the wished for Exchange;—partly by the Obstacles which might be thrown in his Way, were he to persist in remaining here [Obstacles, of which we have an egregious Specimen already] and partly by the alluring Temptations which might be offered him to quit this petty Spot, and reside in America.—I say, many of you must have heard Dr. Franklin haranguing after this Sort; or have seen Letters from him to the same Effect:—For that this was his darling Scheme, even