href="@public@vhost@g@gutenberg@html@files@36100@[email protected]#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor pginternal" tag="{http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml}a">[32]

The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported on July 28, 1914:—

"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs) "replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."[33]

(VI.)—Russia's Final Attempt at Peace.

Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome, in the following terms:—

"The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give—that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia—and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations.'

"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations."[34]

And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:—

"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:—

"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."[35]

The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey, for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1, he says:—

"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.

"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]

That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1, 1914:—

"The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of 'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried out."[37]

Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1, in the following terms:—

"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]

As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward Grey:—

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."[39]