class="tjust">Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, 201; Traits of voluntary activity, 202; The good and bad in non-voluntary behavior, 203; Indifferent voluntary conduct, 205; The moral is introduced when ends have conflicting values, 207; Selection then depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self, 209.

XI.   Problems of Moral Theory 212 Theory grows from practical problems, 212; Three typical problems of reflective practice, 213; Corresponding problems of theory, 214; Their historical sequence, 215; Growth of individualism, 220; The two types of individualism, 221. XII.   Types of Moral Theory 224 § 1. Typical divisions of theories:—Teleological and jural, 224; individual and institutional, 225; empirical and intuitional, 226. § 2. Division of voluntary activity into Inner and Outer:—The "how" and the "what," 227; attitude and consequences, 228; different types of each theory, 229; bearing of each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control, 231. § 3. General interpretation of these theories:—Ordinary view of disposition and of consequences, 232; advantages claimed for emphasis upon consequences, 234; for emphasis upon disposition or attitude, 236; necessity of reconciliation of these theories, 237. XIII.   Conduct and Character 240 Problem of their relation, 240. § 1. The good will of Kant:—Emphasis upon motive, 241; motive with or without consequences, 242; necessity of effort, 243; overt action required to prove motive, 245. § 2. The "Intention" of the Utilitarians:—Emphasis upon consequences, 246; distinction of intention from motive, 247; they are really identical, 248; motive as blind and as intelligent, 249; practical importance of insistence upon consequences, 251; foresight of consequences depends upon motive, 252. § 3. Conduct and character:—The nature of disposition, 254; partial and complete intention, 256; complexity of motives, 257. § 4. Morality of acts and of agents:—Subjective and objective morality, 259; the doer and his deed, 260; summary, 261. XIV.   Happiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire 263 Residence and nature of goodness, 263; happiness as the good, 264; love of happiness as the evil, 265; ambiguity in conception of happiness, 266. § 1. The Object of Desire:—Is it pleasure? 269; desire presupposes instinctive appetites, 270; and objects of thought, 271; happiness and desire, 272; need for standard, 274. § 2. The Conception of Happiness as a Standard:—Utilitarian method, 275; Difficulty of measuring pleasure, 276; character determines the value of a pleasure, 277; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, 279. § 3. The constitution of happiness:—Pleasures depend upon objects, 281; they are qualitative, 282; they vary with disposition, 283; happiness as the moral good, 284. XV.   Happiness and Social Ends 286 Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, 286; value as a theory of social reform, 287; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theory of motive, 289; Bentham's method of reconciling personal and general happiness, 291; Mill's method, 293; sympathy and the social self, 298; the distinctively moral interest, 300; equation of virtue and happiness, 301; moral democracy, 303. XVI.   The Place of Reason in the Moral Life: Moral Knowledge 306 § 1. Problem of reason and desire:—Nature of a reasonable act, 306; theories about moral knowledge, 307. § 2. Kant's theory of practical reason:—Traits of morality, 309; reason as a priori and formal, 310; true meaning of generalization, 313; the general and the social, 314. § 3. Moral sense intuitionalism:—Function of reason,